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Every country in the Middle East – with the exception of Israel – has signed and 
ratified The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and 
renounced its sovereign right to build or acquire nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, 
there have been more violations of the NPT non-proliferation norm in the Middle 
East than in any other region of the world. These violations have eroded the 
credibility of the international non-proliferation regime and represent its inability 
to constrain state behavior and verify compliance in the Middle East. A regional 
nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) has been endorsed by every country in the 
region but there has been little progress made toward achieving this goal. Israel is 
the only nuclear power in the Middle East and would have to disarm in order to 
establish a NWFZ. The Arab states and Iran believe Israeli nuclear disarmament 
should be the first step toward the creation of a NWFZ and they continue to exert 
diplomatic pressure on Israel to join the NPT. Israeli leaders argue that regional 
peace and normalized relations should precede the establishment of a NWFZ in 
the Middle East. These discrepant views on sequencing have stalled every 
initiative to establish a regional arms control treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons 
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Chapter One  
 
Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East 
 
 
They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning 
hooks; nations shall not lift a sword against nation, nor shall they learn 
war any more. But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his 
fig tree and none shall make them afraid.  
 
– the Prophet Micah 
 
As far as a nuclear weapons-free zone, you know, when the lion lies down 
with the lamb, and you don't need a new lamb every day to satisfy the lion, 
then we might have this kind of transformation in the Middle East. 
 
-- Binyamin Netanyahu 
 
The nuclear specter that haunts the Middle East is altering the strategic calculus of 
several countries and threatens to further destabilize a region already characterized by a 
high level of both domestic and interstate conflict. The decade-long nuclear standoff with 
Iran has heightened anxiety throughout the Gulf and wider Middle East. On April 29, 
2014 Saudi Arabia conducted its largest ever military exercise, which included 130,000 
troops and intermediate range missiles capable of reaching Iran. Operation “Abdullah’s 
Shield” took place near Saudi Arabia’s northern border and was intended to send a clear 
message of deterrence to the regime in Tehran.1 Moreover, Saudi officials have publicly 
stated their intention of acquiring “off the shelf” nuclear warheads from Pakistan. Israel 
has responded to Iran’s nuclear capability, which now appears to be a fait accompli, by 
bolstering its second-strike capability with submarines capable of launching missiles with 
nuclear warheads. The perceived decline of American influence in the region has reduced 
                                                
1 “Saudi Arabia Puts on Show with ‘Abdullah’s Shield’ Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle 




the credibility of U.S security guarantees to its allies and increased the value of acquiring 
an indigenous deterrent.  
Israeli leaders have repeatedly expressed the view that a nuclear-armed Iran 
would present an existential threat to the Jewish state and have planned to use military 
force to prevent Tehran from achieving nuclear capability. U.S and Israeli public 
statements that “all options are on the table” to prevent Iran from “going nuclear” 
exacerbate tensions in the region and the imponderable repercussions of a military strike 
cause fear throughout the Middle East. The 2007 Israeli strike on a Syrian nuclear reactor 
was the most recent instance of Tel Aviv’s doctrine of using military force to prevent 
adversaries from developing nuclear capability. As a consequence, Iran has hardened its 
nuclear facilities and spread them throughout the country. If Tehran decided to withdraw 
from international treaties or test a nuclear device it would provoke and arms race in the 
Middle East.  
The international norm of nuclear prohibition established by the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has not altered state behavior in the Middle 
East. In fact, Saddam Hussein strategically chose to remain in the NPT in order to 
conceal his nuclear weapons program and allay international suspicion. The monitoring 
and verification system carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has failed to detect past violations and, as a result of its diminished credibility, cannot 
mitigate the security dilemma that operates in the Middle East; countries will not 
renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons – or, in the case of Israel, a nuclear arsenal – if 
they are not assured that other states in the region will be equally constrained. A regional 
security regime is the only way to address the unique security environment in the Middle 
 
East and abolish nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Middle 
East, verified by credible bilateral inspections, would serve the interest of every country 
in the region. And yet, despite a regional consensus on the goal of nuclear prohibition and 
disarmament, every initiative to establish a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone 
(MENWFZ) has failed to yield results. These initiatives have not gotten off the ground 
because they do not address the domestic political conditions, economic incentives and 
security dilemma that drive nuclear ambitions in the region and instead focus exclusively 
on pressuring Israel to sign the NPT and end its policy of “nuclear ambiguity.”  In 
addition, the hostility and lack of normalized relations among many states in the Middle 
East precludes the establishment of a credible regional verification and compliance 
mechanism.  
Every country in the Middle East -- with the exception of Israel – is a signatory to 
(NPT) and is, therefore, already obligated “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons.” Nonetheless, more countries in the Middle East have pursued nuclear 
weapons in violation of their NPT commitments than in any other region of the world. In 
addition to Iran’s current quest for nuclear capability, Libya, Syria and Iraq have also 
attempted to either acquire nuclear weapons or develop an indigenous nuclear capability. 
Throughout the 1960s, prior to the entry into force of the NPT, Egypt’s popular 
nationalist president Gamal Abdel Nasser developed a nuclear program with the goal of 
deterring Israel; Saddam Hussein developed a robust clandestine nuclear program and 
was forcibly disarmed after the 1991 Gulf War; in 2003 Libyan dictator Muammar 
Qaddafi gave up his nuclear ambitions after three decades of nuclear pursuit. Syria is 
suspected of harboring nuclear aspirations and has violated its NPT obligations by 
 
secretly receiving extensive foreign assistance in developing its nuclear industry. Faced 
with international pressure to curb its uranium enrichment program, Iran has threatened 
to exercise its legal right to withdraw from the NPT. Despite decades of nuclear pursuit in 
the Middle East, Israel remains the only nuclear power in the region.  
 Nuclear pursuit in the Middle East is fueled by conflict and competition. The 
Middle East is one of the most unstable and war-prone regions in the world, characterized 
by a high level of conflict and deep-seated national, ethnic and religious rivalries. Over 
the past century, the Middle East has been the site of major interstate wars and foreign 
interventions. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 altered the balance of power in 
the region and sparked a quest for regional hegemony. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both 
highly militarized states that lend political, economic and military support to their proxies 
throughout the region. In addition, the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict fuels 
tension in the region; most states do not recognize the Jewish state’s right to exist, a fact 
that makes cooperation on security matters tenuous at best. Several states in the Middle 
East do not maintain diplomatic relations and national territorial disputes exist in the Gulf 
and Levant.  
Countries in the Middle East also suffer crises of political legitimacy and civil 
conflict, which destabilize the entire region as “domestic political tensions are directed 
outward in a centrifugal fashion.”2 The high-conflict security environment causes leaders 
in the Middle East to value the utility of nuclear weapons and the lack of cooperation 
impedes efforts to establish a security regime to prohibit them. 
                                                
2 Gerald M. Steinberg, “Realism, Politics and Culture in Middle East Arms Control 
Negotiations,” International Negotiation 10, no. 3 (2005): 14. 
 
  Since the 1980s, there have been several preventive strikes on nuclear facilities in 
the Middle East. In addition to the 2007 Israeli strike on Syria’s al-Kibar reactor, Israel 
also sabotaged a French-made reactor destined for Iraq and in 1981 conducted a ‘bolt 
from the blue’ strike on the same Osiraq reactor, eliciting international condemnation. In 
1980, Iran attacked an Iraqi nuclear reactor and Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr reactor five 
separate times throughout the 1980s. The U.S. bombed Iraq’s nuclear installations in 
1991, 1993 and 1998 and in 2003 the U.S launched a counter-proliferation war aimed 
ostensibly at ending Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.3 The United States and Israel have 
also relied on sabotage and assassination to curb Iran’s nuclear pursuit. 
Israel’s strategy of using military force to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-
armed rival is known as the “Begin Doctrine” and reflects Israeli pessimism concerning 
the possibility of achieving security through a stable “balance of terror” in the Middle 
East. Guy Ziv observes: “In the stark realities of the Middle East – a region embedded 
with dictatorships, deep animosities, religious fanaticism, and a widespread culture of 
violence – the prospect of nuclear proliferation does not bode well for stability and peace; 
it would more likely further destabilize the Middle East.”4 
Kenneth Waltz presents a brief counterargument in a Foreign Affairs article titled 
“Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.” Waltz argues that Israel’s status as the only nuclear 
power in the Middle East causes instability and that a nuclear-armed Iran would stabilize 
the region by restoring the balance of military power. Waltz contends: “It is Israel’s 
                                                
3 Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A 
Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 6 (2010): 
831–59. 
4 Guy Ziv, “To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The Impact of Nuclear Ambiguity on Israeli 
Security,” Israel Studies Forum, vol. 22 (2007): 80. 
 
 
nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. 
Power, after all, begs to be balanced.”5 The response of states in the Middle East, 
however, suggests that they do not view a nuclear Iran as a regional answer to Israel’s 
nuclear monopoly. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was quoted in a Wikileaks document 
requesting that the U.S. use military force against Iran in order to “cut off the head of the 
snake.”6 Arab silence after the Israeli strike on Syria’s nuclear reactor also indicates that 
states in the region do not perceive a nuclear balance as a source of stability.  
Mohammed ElBaredei, the former Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, argues that Israel’s status as the only non-NPT signatory in the Middle 
East is undermining the non-proliferation regime. He states: “The nuclear non-
proliferation regime has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab public opinion because 
of the perceived double standards concerning Israel, the only state in the region outside 
the NPT and known to possess nuclear weapons.”7 From the Israeli perspective, however, 
the NPT does not adequately address its security concerns and Israel must maintain its 
nuclear deterrent as a weapon of last resort to guarantee its survival. The Arab world, 
however, “does not perceive the Israeli nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but as a 
compellence weapon to make the Arabs accept an unacceptable status quo.”8  
This paper will answer the following questions: Why has there been a 
disproportionate pursuit of nuclear weapons in the Middle East? What are the 
                                                
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean 
Stability,” Foreign Aff. 91 (2012): 3. 
6 Arshad Mohammed and Ross Colvin, “Saudi King Urged U.S. to Attack Iran: WikiLeaks,” 
Reuters, November 29, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-wikileaks-usa-
idUSTRE6AP06Z20101129. 
7 “Israel Seen as Undermining Disarmament” Reuters, February 16, 2009, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/02/16/idINIndia-38051120090216 
8 Abdel Monem Said Aly, “In the Shadow of Israeli Nuclear Bombs: Egyptian Threat 
Perceptions,” Brown J. World Aff. 3 (1996): 158. 
 
determinants of nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East? Why has the NPT failed 
to constrain state behavior in the Middle East? How have states managed to pursue 
clandestine nuclear programs while under IAEA safeguards? Is Israel’s nuclear monopoly 
the cause of nuclear proliferation in the region, as Kenneth Waltz suggests? Do states in 
the Middle East have faith in the NPT to meet their security needs? What regional arms 
control initiatives have been proposed? Has the focus on disarming Israel caused the 
failure of these initiatives? What are the different national perspectives on what steps to 
take in order to establish a MENWFZ?  
The numerous violations of the NPT in the Middle East demonstrate the failure of 
the NPT and international nonproliferation regime to verify compliance and punish 
violations. Proposals have been made to establish a regional MENWF but, to date, 
preventive war and nuclear deterrence have taken the place of arms control and 
disarmament. Progress toward establishing a MENWFZ has been hampered by the 
exclusive focus on disarming Israel to the exclusion of all other issues, including the 
establishment of a regional compliance and verification mechanism and addressing the 
security dilemma that causes leaders to value nuclear weapons. The goals of disarmament 
and nonproliferation are noble and can provide for security in the Middle East if countries 









 The establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East is a noble goal and would 
benefit every country in the region if it established a credible regional verification and 
compliance mechanism. This paper will present a brief survey of the vast theoretical 
literature on the determinants of nuclear proliferation in order to explain and understand 
the instances of nuclear pursuit in the Middle East. In addition, I define the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the global non-proliferation regime and 
nuclear-weapon-free zones. 
 The case studies in this paper present brief histories of the nuclear programs in 
Iran, Israel and Iraq and assess their motives for pursuing and maintaining nuclear 
weapons, as well as their perceptions of the NPT and a potential Middle East NWFZ. The 
last case study details the efforts of Egypt to promote a NWFZ and pressure Israel to join 
the NPT. The paper concludes with an analysis of the case studies and explains the failure 










Review of the Nuclear Proliferation Literature 
Any effort to establish a MENWZ must address the incentives to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons it is not surprising that, despite 
the small number of case studies, so much scholarly writing has been devoted to 
understanding the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. The theoretical 
literature seeks to explain why states choose to pursue nuclear weapons, why some of 
those states later abandon the effort and why some states never pursue nuclear weapons. 
In addition, the literature explains the phenomenon of “latent nuclear states”-- those with 
the technical capability to build nuclear bombs on short notice if and when they choose. 
Nuclear weapons acquisition in different countries is convincingly explained by distinct 
variables; for example, South Africa pursued nuclear weapons despite the absence of a 
credible security threat and Egypt chose nuclear restraint even when faced with a nuclear-
armed adversary. Most states have not sought to acquire nuclear weapons but a better 
understanding of nuclear dynamics can inform a potential regional nonproliferation 
regime in the Middle East.  
 The real proliferation puzzle is not why states choose to acquire nuclear weapons 
but why most states haven exercised nuclear restraint and chosen to forgo the nuclear 
option. In 2014, there are only nine nuclear weapon states: The U.S., Russia, the U.K., 
France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. In 1993, South Africa publicly 
admitted to having secretly built nuclear bombs but disarmed on the eve of transition to 
majority rule and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus were “born nuclear” and acquired nuclear weapons upon the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. All three states eventually gave up their nuclear weapons 
 
and joined the NPT as NNWS. Today, there are only four more nuclear weapon states 
than when the NPT entered into force in 1970 – an average of one new nuclear state per 
decade. Nuclear weapons scholar George Bunn argues: “The single most important factor 
in producing this success has been the nonproliferation norm established by the NPT and 
the incentives for remaining non-nuclear that the NPT helped initiate.”9 According to 
Bunn, the NPT has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons by lowering the cost of 
cooperation, increasing transparency and mitigating the security dilemma among NNWS.  
 
Technical Determinism 
In the years preceding the signing of the NPT, the slow pace of nuclear 
proliferation was not anticipated. In 1961, President Kennedy warned that by 1975 there 
would be up to “fifteen, twenty or twenty-five new nuclear weapons powers.”10 Kennedy 
based his assessment on a secret intelligence report from Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara that estimated the cost of acquiring nuclear weapons would “come down by a 
factor of two to five times.”11 Kennedy’s pessimistic estimate stemmed from the belief 
that technology rather than political incentives are the principle driver of a state’s nuclear 
policy. According to this perspective, the diffusion of nuclear technology would lead to 
uncontrolled proliferation. In 1960, a British scholar summed up this logic: “So far no 
                                                
9 George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” Arms 
Control Today 33, no. 10 (2003): 4–10. 
10 Peter R. Lavoy, “Predicting Nuclear Proliferation: A Declassified Documentary Record,” 




country has resisted the temptation to make its own atomic weapons once it has acquired 
the physical ability to do so.”12  
The technological determinist hypothesis ignores political incentives for nuclear 
proliferation and argues that nuclear technology is the primary determinant of nuclear 
proliferation. States, therefore, will build bombs as soon as it is technically possible.13 
According to this theory, President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program and the NPT 
have backfired by providing states with nuclear technology and know-how and reducing 
the cost of weapons proliferation. In the 1950s, the U.S provided Iran with a nuclear 
research reactor than ran on high enriched uranium. According to nuclear weapons 
scholar Leonard Weiss: “It is legitimate to ask whether Atoms for Peace accelerated 
proliferation by helping some nations achieve more advanced arsenals than would have 
otherwise been the case. The jury has been in for some time on this question, and the 
answer is yes.”14  
Matthew Fuhrmann argues that the dual-use dilemma of nuclear technology 
makes peaceful nuclear cooperation a major determinant of weapons proliferation. He 
writes, “All forms of atomic assistance – whether it involves training scientists, supplying 
reactors, or building fuel fabrication facilities – raise the likelihood that nuclear weapons 
will spread.”15 Fuhrmann argues that peaceful nuclear assistance combined with security 
threats further increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. States receiving 
atomic assistance do not have to make a formal decision to develop nuclear weapons for 
                                                
12 Moeed Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons," 
(Brookings Institution (2009): 14 
13 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the 
Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 1 (1996): 43–60. 
14 Leonard Weiss, “Atoms for Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 6 (2003): 34–44. 
15 Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements,” International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 12. 
 
nuclear energy cooperation and technical training to increase the probability of nuclear 
proliferation. States only choose to build nuclear bombs after it becomes a realistic goal. 
According to theories of technical determinism, preventing the diffusion of technology 
and know-how are as relevant to nonproliferation policy as addressing the political 
incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. The recent surge of interest in nuclear power 
throughout the Gulf are interpreted as a strategy of hedging to develop latent nuclear 
weapons technology through a civilian program built with foreign assistance. Regarding 
the “nuclear renaissance” in the Middle East, nuclear weapons scholar Joseph Cirincione 
argues: “This is not about energy; it is a nuclear hedge against Iran.”16 
The existence of several latent nuclear states capable of building bombs that 
nonetheless choose not to -- the so-called nuclear “dogs that did not bark” –exposes a 
flaw in the technical hypothesis and determinants other than technical capability must 
determine nuclear decision-making. Richard Betts argues that employing supply-side 
controls to prevent nuclear proliferation is “limited in vision” because “it focuses on the 
necessary rather sufficient conditions for proliferation and hides the significant 
distinction between capability and the exercise of capability.”17 Jonathan Schell, a scholar 
and prominent advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons, also argues that political 





                                                
16 Joseph Cirincione and Uri Leventer, “The Middle East’s Nuclear Surge," The New York Times, 
April 13, 2007, accessed May 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/opinion/13iht-
edcirin.1.7097430.html?_r=0. 
17 Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs & Nonproliferation,” Foreign Policy, no. 26 
(April 1, 1977): 163, doi:10.2307/1147904.  
 
If we think of the NPT as a dam holding back nuclear proliferation, then 
the spread of nuclear capacity is like water collecting behind the dam. 
That tide can only rise, increasing the pressure. The world's safety 
ultimately depends not on the number of nations that want to build nuclear 
weapons but cannot, but on the number that can but do not. If the spread 
of nuclear weapons is to be prevented over the long run, it cannot come 
through restrictions on nations' capacity. Instead, it must come by 
influencing their will, which entails the use of diplomatic and political 
means -- the very means whose breakdown we are now witnessing.18  
 
The Security Model 
The realist theory of nuclear proliferation has dominated the field since the advent 
of the nuclear age. The realist framework of international relations argues that countries 
exist in an anarchic international system and must rely on the principle of self-help to 
maximize their security and ensure their own survival. Military power is the surest way to 
achieve security and nuclear weapons are therefore the ultimate security guarantee. States 
pursue nuclear weapons to maximize their security and to balance nuclear-armed rivals. 
The realist security model of proliferation explains the “nuclear domino effect” in which 
countries pursues nuclear weapons in reaction to the threat from a nuclear-armed 
adversary. George Schultz summarized the realist nuclear logic: “Proliferation begets 
proliferation.” Realist theory focuses on external security concerns to explain the spread 
of nuclear weapons; domestic politics, leader psychology and international cooperation 
are irrelevant to a state’s security calculus and nuclear policy. 
The nuclear domino effect impelled the U.S. to develop a bomb before Nazi 
Germany; the Soviet Union then built a nuclear bomb in response to the United States; 
China built a bomb in response to the Soviet and U.S. bomb; India built a bomb in 
response to China; and Pakistan built a bomb in response to India. The decisions by both 
                                                
18 Jonathan Schell, “The Folly of Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, (2000): 22–46. 
 
France and the U.K., both protected under the NATO nuclear umbrella, do not fit neatly 
into the realist security paradigm and are better explained by both nationalism and a 
desire for “a seat at the table.” And Israel, the first country in the Middle East to pursue 
nuclear weapons, was seeking to deter against Arab conventional military superiority. 
The NPT, according to the realist framework, is solves a collection action problem by 
assuring NNWS that other states will also forgo the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Scott 
Sagan sums up this logic: “Each state would prefer to become the only nuclear weapons 
power in the region, but since that is an unlikely outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal, 
it is willing to refrain from proliferation if, and only if, its neighbors remain non-
nuclear.”19 
Neorealist scholar and proliferation optimist Kenneth Waltz argues that nuclear 
weapons increased global stability during the Cold War and have had the same impact on 
the one nuclear dyad to emerge after the Cold War -- India and Pakistan. The logic of 
rational deterrence theory asserts that the likelihood of war between nuclear-armed rivals 
is reduced due to the certainty that both sides would pay an intolerably high cost. With 
conventional weapons the outcomes of war are uncertain and leaders “entertain illusions 
of victory at supportable costs.”20 Nuclear weapons eliminate the miscalculations and 






                                                
19 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54. 
20 Waltz, Kenneth N. "Nuclear myths and political realities." American Political Science 
Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 734. 
 
Catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders 
of states will shrink in horror from initiating them. With nuclear weapons, 
stability and peace rest on easy calculations of what one country can do to 
another. Anyone – political leader or a man in the street – can see that 
catastrophe lurks if events spiral out of control and nuclear warheads start 
to fly.21 
 
According to Waltz, nuclear weapons do not serve any purpose other than to prevent war 
between countries that possess them. They have no offensive strategic value and their 
psychological effects alone make them credible deterrents. Because states are rational 
actors concerned above all else with their own survival they will not risk a devastating 
nuclear exchange. As a result, “The probability of major war among states having nuclear 
weapons approaches zero.”22 
The counterintuitive logic of nuclear deterrence – that “safety depends on the 
absolute and unchallenged capacity of each side to annihilate the other's population”23 -- 
is a persuasive theory. Carried to its logical conclusion, rational deterrence theory 
suggests that in a world where every country possessed nuclear weapons major wars 
would be abolished. Rather than fear the spread of nuclear weapons, it should be 
welcomed. Jonathan Schell refers to this faith in the ability of nuclear weapons to achieve 
what international institutions cannot “nuclear Wilsonianism.”24 
The realist theory of nuclear weapons proliferation is mono-causal; countries 
build nuclear weapons in response to a security threat. The theory is parsimonious and 
explains reactive proliferation following World War II but has over-predicted the spread 
of nuclear weapons. Why would a technically capable state not build (or give up) nuclear 
weapons, the ultimate security guarantee? Realists cite the absence of a credible security 
                                                
21 Ibid., 734 
22 Ibid., 740. 
23 Schell, " The Folly of Arms Control," 26.  
24 Schell, " The Folly of Arms Control."  
 
threat or extended deterrence from a nuclear power to explain the slow spread of nuclear 
weapons. Countries, however, have acted contrary to realist predictions; Egypt for 
example abandoned its nuclear pursuit despite military defeats to Israel, a nuclear power, 
in 1967 and 1973 
T.V Paul argues that nuclear restraint is explained by a state’s awareness of the 
security dilemma and fear of provoking adversaries. Contrary to realist theory, which 
assumes states’ pursuit of power to be a zero-sum game measured in relative gains, 
Paul’s theory of prudential realism explains restraint as a security strategy: “The self-
help system does not automatically direct a state to maximize its relative gains, because it 
knows that single handed pursuit of security maximization through nuclear acquisition 
could eventually result in a loss of security for itself and for other significant actors in the 
region."25 Technically capable states choose forbearance when they assess that 
antagonizing regional allies or adversaries would undermine their security more than 
nuclear weapons would enhance it. According to Paul, “These states behave as prudential 
realists - i.e., they balance their interests, capabilities, and intentions to the extent of not 
threatening others while maximizing their own security in a benign environment."26 
According to Paul, countries in low or moderate conflict zones make cost-benefit 
calculations based on an assessment of the most probable threat and avoid exacerbating 
the security dilemma with opaque nuclear postures or the overt pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, while countries in high-conflict regions such as the Middle East, base security 
strategies on worst-case assumptions. Prudential realist calculations do not influence 
nuclear decision-making in high-conflict regions because the cost of miscalculating is too 
                                                
25 Thazha Varkey Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons McGill-
Queen’s Press-MQUP, (2000): 25. 
26 Ibid., 15. 
 
high. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability provides a case in point: the regime in Tehran 
values its nuclear program despite repeated threats from the U.S. and Israel to stop it. 
Iranian leaders value the utility of nuclear capability enough to risk antagonizing their 
adversaries and risking a preventive strike.  
Seen through the lens of prudential realism, the nonproliferation regime and the 
NPT have a limited role in states’ calculations of nuclear forbearance; in low- or 
medium-conflict regions the operation of the security dilemma motivates states to 
exercise restraint, and in high-conflict regions, such as East Asia and the Middle East,  
alliances and extended deterrence are more effective than security regimes. The 
nonproliferation regime, however, “becomes more important once a state chooses a non-
nuclear policy, as it provides assurance of similar behavior by other states.”27  
 
Domestic Politics and Leader Psychology 
Scott Sagan proposes a framework for explaining the spread of nuclear weapons 
that focuses on domestic politics and state bureaucracies rather than the relative 
distribution of power and the security dilemma. In his domestic politics model, Sagan 
argues that threats to a state’s security can have different outcomes depending on the 
parochial interests of influential decision-makers within the state. A country’s military 
and nuclear bureaucracies can exaggerate threat perceptions to justify a nuclear weapons 
program if it meets their narrow interests. Sagan writes: “Security threats are therefore 
not the central cause of weapons decisions: they are merely windows of opportunity 
through which parochial interests can jump.”28 Sagan argues that India’s decision to 
                                                
27 Paul, Power versus Prudence, 67. 
28 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” 65. 
 
develop a nuclear deterrent was not a reaction to China’s 1964 detonation but the product 
of a protracted bureaucratic struggle between those who supported global nuclear 
disarmament and Homi Bhabba, the influential head of India’s Atomic Energy 
Commission. In 1974, Prime Minister Indira Ghandi was responding to domestic political 
pressure and not security threats when she allowed for a peaceful nuclear test. In South 
Africa, domestic politics, and not the threat of Soviet aggression explain the decision to 
build nuclear bombs; Brazil and Argentina chose to pursue a bilateral policy of nuclear 
abstention after both countries transitioned from military to civilian democratic rule in the 
1980s. Sagan’s theory can be applied to Iran where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) supports the nuclear program for its own parochial economic incentives. In 
the domestic politics models, the NPT plays a role in empowering state bureaucracies and 
political actors that are opposed to nuclear weapons.  
Sagan also proposes a norms model of nuclear acquisition that views nuclear 
weapons as possessing powerful symbolic value and nuclear policy as a reflection of a 
state’s identity in the international system. The prohibition against the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons was codified by the NPT, which shifted, “the norm concerning what 
acts grant prestige and legitimacy from the 1960s notion of ‘joining the nuclear club’ to 
the 1990s notion of joining ‘the club of nations adhering to the NPT.’”29 Sagan argues 
that as a result of the shift in the international norm, French nuclear acquisition and 
Ukrainian abstention both served the same purpose -- to enhance their “prestige and 
legitimacy.”  
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The French decision to acquire nuclear weapons was motivated by a desire to 
restore French grandeur and great power status after experiencing occupation during 
World War II and the turmoil of the 1958 Algerian crisis; deterring Soviet aggression was 
a justification and not the primary purpose of France’s nuclear arsenal. In contrast, 
Ukraine relinquished 4,000 nuclear weapons it “inherited” after the break up of the Soviet 
Union, a decision that cannot be explained by either the security or domestic politics 
model. Sagan argues that the NPT norm against proliferation motivated Ukraine to 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal in order to establish itself as a legitimate sovereign state 
because, “The strength of the NPT regime created a history in which the most recent 
examples of new or potential nuclear states were called rogue states.”30 In the Middle 
East, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and the current Iranian regime – all of whom 
have been labeled with the appellation “rogue” -- perceived nuclear weapons as symbolic 
tools of prestige. Egypt, on the other hand, has based its legitimacy on the decision to 
abandon its nuclear pursuit and pursue nonproliferation and disarmament from inside the 
nonproliferation regime. 
In contrast to the mono-causal realist framework, Sagan’s models explain nuclear 
acquisition using a combination of security threats, domestic political dynamics and 
international norms: “Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of 
national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic 
debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative 
symbols of modernity.”31  
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Etel Solingen proposes theory of nuclear decision-making that focuses on regime 
survival strategy rather than state security or international cooperation. She argues that 
state-level determinants of nuclear policy are often opaque because leaders frame policy 
decisions as a response to state security when in fact these policies are intended to 
preserve a regime’s hold on power. Solingen indentifies two types of regimes: “outward 
looking” regimes that pursue economic growth through integration in the global economy 
and “inward looking,” nationalist regimes that pursue import substitution economies and 
economic autarky. Outward looking domestic coalitions adopt international norms 
against nuclear weapons acquisition and are unwilling to pay the political and economic 
costs of breaking their NPT commitments. On the contrary, inward looking regimes 
define themselves in opposition to the international community and are less likely to be 
constrained by global norms. The strong symbolic value of nuclear weapons appeals to 
nationalist regimes. In “Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle 
East” Solingen argues that leaders in the Middle East have pursued nuclear weapons 
programs for reasons other than security: “Alternative norms stemming from nationalist, 
religious, and other identities invested nuclear weapons with redemptive value as tools of 
modernization and defiance of the international order.”32  
In her analysis of the motivations of all nuclear aspirants after the entry into force 
of the NPT Solingen determines that no democracy, “acquired nuclear technology for the 
purposes of deterring other democracies.”33 Solingen also questions the ability of security 
guarantees to curb the spread of nuclear weapons: “U.S. and Soviet commitments to 
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client states (North Korea, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan) did not lead these states to renounce 
nuclear weapons. Nor did the absence of security guarantees play any role in decisions by 
Egypt (1971), Libya (2003), South Africa, Argentina, or Brazil to reverse nuclear 
ambitions.”34  
Jacques Hyman’s theory of nuclear proliferation focuses on the psychology and 
belief systems of state leaders. According to Hymans building the bomb is a form of 
national expression and leader’s who pursue nuclear weapons share a particular “national 
identity conception” (NIC). Hymans identifies four NICs: sportsmanlike nationalists, 
sportsmanlike subalterns, oppositional nationalists and oppositional subalterns. 
Oppositional nationalist leaders are unique in their willingness to pursue nuclear weapons 
because they “possess intense fear of an external enemy combined with an equally 
intense pride in their nation’s natural capacity to face down the enemy.”35 
India’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons can be seen through the lens of 
Hyman’s belief systems theory and national identity conception. The decision to conduct 
nuclear tests in 1998 was determined by Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Hindu nationalist 
party’s opposition to Muslim Pakistan. North Korea, according to Hymans, is ruled by 
“dyed-in-the-wool oppositional nationalists” who are unlikely to be persuaded to abandon 
their nuclear strategy because they perceive nuclear weapons, “not as a means to an end 
but as an end in itself – as a matter of national self-expression.” Hymans argues that 
American nonproliferation policy has suffered from the mistaken belief that countries are 
all rational and unitary actors susceptible to economic inducements and military threats. 
Hymans argues that the slow spread of nuclear weapons is due to the fact that only 
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oppositional nationalist leaders choose to pursue nuclear weapons and there are few 
leaders of that type. According to Hymans, the NPT is successful because only a “few 
state leaders have desired the thing that it prohibits.”36 
 
Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation 
Scott Sagan questions Kenneth Waltz’s “heroic assumptions” about the rationality 
of state behavior and argues that nuclear weapons destabilize regional and global 
security. Sagan explains how the biases and “bounded rationality” of professional 
militaries can fail to establish the three conditions necessary for stable nuclear deterrence: 
1) there must not be a preventive strike while a state is developing its nuclear arsenal; 2) 
a country must develop second-strike capability; and 3) nuclear weapons must be 
controlled to prevent accidental use. Sagan contends that military bureaucracies often 
have interests that can prevent them from fulfilling these requirements. Even the strictly 
controlled nuclear arsenal of the U.S. has been prone to near catastrophic accidents. 
There is a greater risk, Sagan argues, of nuclear accidents and deterrence failures in 
countries where the military in not under civilian control. Sagan believes that, “The 
actual behavior of new proliferators will be strongly influenced by the powerful military 
organizations within those states and the common biases, rigid routines, and the parochial 
interests of these military organizations will lead to deterrence failures and uses of 
nuclear weapons despite national interests to the contrary.”37 Richard Betts, writing in 
1977, also cautioned against, “undue confidence that the pax atomica of stable U.S. – 
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Soviet deterrence can be replicated in other regions.”38 Jonathan Schell questions the 
assumption of security and stability created by nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. 
“The hope for stability,” Schell writes, “coexisted uneasily at best with the readiness for 
prompt mutual annihilation, and the very terror that was the mothers' milk of deterrence 
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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 
The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, a 
system of international treaties and export regulations administered by domestic agencies 
and international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The aim of the NPT is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons in order to prevent “the 
devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war.”40 The NPT is the 
most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty and it is nearly universal; only 
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are not members. The NPT opened for signature 
in 1967 and legalized the possession of nuclear weapons by countries that had tested a 
nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967. The five nuclear weapon states (NWS) sanctioned 
by the treaty are the United States, The Soviet Union/Russia, Britain, France and China. 
All other state parties to the treaty are designated non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) 
and are legally obligated not to “acquire or otherwise manufacture nuclear weapons.” In 
1995, NPT member states voted to extend the treaty indefinitely. 
Egypt, Iran and other members of the 118 member Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) have criticized the monopoly of nuclear weapons by a small number of states and 
the division of the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. One critic calls the NPT a 
“discriminatory treaty” and a “con game.”41 Joseph Nye, however, argues that there was a 
logic to the inequality of the NPT and that during the Cold War any effort to either 
abolish nuclear weapons or allow for their uncontrolled spread would have “significantly 
                                                
40 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html 
41 N. D. Jayaprakash, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The ’Greatest Con Game’,” Economic 
and Political Weekly, (2008): 43–45. 
 
increased the risk of nuclear war.”42 The end of the Cold War however eliminated Nye’s 
rationale for the NPT’s discriminatory design. “The double standard provisionally built 
into the NPT,” argues Jonathan Schell, “although obviously inequitable, could be 
understood. Once the Soviet Union disappeared, however, the foundations of the 
argument shifted.”43  
Despite its indefinite extension in 1995, the NPT is now challenged by an erosion 
in credibility due to both its inability to prevent proliferation and its perceived double 
standard. U.S. nonproliferation policy after September 11, 2001 increasingly relied on 
unilateral policies and eschewed the multilateral framework of the NPT and 
nonproliferation regime. There is an inherent conflict between NWS, who are more 
concerned with promoting nuclear nonproliferation and NNWS, who focus more on 
nuclear disarmament. This division is a hurdle to arms control cooperation in the Middle 
East where Israel seeks to curb the spread of nuclear weapons while all other states in the 
region want Israel to disarm. 
The grand bargain of the NPT guarantees NNWS the “inalienable right” to 
assistance with civilian nuclear programs and access to “equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in 
exchange for renouncing their right to nuclear weapons (Article IV). The NPT mandates 
the IAEA to both assist in the diffusion of nuclear technology and prevent diversion of 
nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons programs. To that end, each 
NNWS is obligated to sign a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in order to verify 
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fulfillment of a state’s treaty obligations and confirm the “correctness and completeness” 
of its declared nuclear material (Article III).   
 Civilian nuclear energy programs, however, can serve as both a cloak and a 
justification for states to receive atomic assistance that moves them closer to achieving 
nuclear weapons capability. Lewis A. Dunn, a nuclear weapons scholar and policymaker, 
argues that, “The use of the Article IV right as a cover behind which a country can pursue 
nuclear weapons is the most glaring weakness of the NPT.”44 Most atomic assistance 
regulated by the nonproliferation regime has not contributed to nuclear weapons 
proliferation but the IAEA has a mixed record of detecting and reporting clandestine 
nuclear activity. While under IAEA Safeguards, several NNWS have either diverted 
nuclear material from nuclear power reactors or established clandestine facilities 
dedicated to the production of nuclear material for a weapons program.  
Both Iran and Libya developed clandestine uranium enrichment plants while 
under IAEA safeguards. In the 1990s, the IAEA discovered that Iraq had developed an 
advanced covert nuclear program and that Romania and North Korea had secretly 
separated plutonium “right under the noses of IAEA inspectors who were busy tracking 
declared activities.”45 In 1997, in response to these violations, the IAEA member states 
agreed to an Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements. The Additional 
Protocol gives IAEA inspectors access to both declared and undeclared nuclear facilities. 
The Additional Protocol, however, is voluntarily adopted by NNWS and many states, 
including Iran, have opted not to sign it. A former Iraqi nuclear scientist believes the 
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Additional Protocol, “is capable of detecting future Iraqs but if the old IAEA safeguards 
culture prevails, the new system will not be a match for a determined and untiring 
Saddam or other proliferators.”46  
Article I of the NPT obligates NWS “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever 
nuclear weapons … or control over such weapons.” In addition, NWS must not “assist 
encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons.” The 2005 U.S – India nuclear deal violates Article I and “overturned 
decades of U.S and global non-proliferation policy” by providing assistance to a country 
that has detonated nuclear weapons but never signed the NPT. During the 2010 NPT 
review conference, the 118 members of NAM argued that the U.S. – India nuclear deal 
gave more rights to a non-NPT signatory than to members. One analyst concludes, 
“Other states have begun to look at India’s example and ask, ‘If India, why not us?’ 
India’s brand of exceptionalism matters less to these states than the possibility of 
exceptionalism and a few are prepared to make their own case.”47 In his analysis of 
nuclear assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann finds that NPT membership does not increase the 
likelihood that a state will receive atomic assistance and that, on the contrary, states 
instead provide assistance to promote their strategic interests, as the U.S – India deal 
demonstrates.48  
NWS are also obligated to work in “good faith” toward the goal of “complete 
disarmament” (Article VI). The slow progress made toward achieving the goal of nuclear 
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abolition expressed in Article VI weakens the nonproliferation norm. Part of the bargain 
that led to the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT required NWS to declare their 
commitment to disarmament. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is 
one initiate that works toward this goal. The treaty opened for signatures in 1996 and has 
been signed by France, Russia and the U.K; in 1999, however, the U.S. senate voted 
against the treaty. In his speech in Prague in 2009, however, President Obama vowed to 
“aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” One 
observer contends, “The best strategy to address post-9/11 challenges to nuclear 
proliferation is to reconnect nuclear non-proliferation with nuclear disarmament.”49 The 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed in 2011 by the U.S. and Russia 
works toward the goal of disarmament and greatly reduces both countries’ nuclear 
arsenals. China, France and the U.K. however have not reduced their arsenals and a 
perception that NWS are not decreasing their reliance on nuclear weapons could impact 
global proliferation dynamics, especially in the Middle East. 
In 2003, North Korea exercised its Article X right to withdraw from the treaty 
with three months notice. The withdrawal right was included in the drafting of the treaty 
as a way to achieve universality by convincing skeptical industrialized countries to sign 
but it has become a major loophole of the NPT. In 2013, former Iranian nuclear 
negotiator Hossein Moussavian wrote, “Withdrawing from the treaty has become an 
increasingly attractive option within the decision-making circles of the country.” He 
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argues, “Iran can substitute the treaty with the supreme leader’s religious fatwa banning 
all WMD.”50  
 
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones 
Article VII of the NPT endorses the creation of NWFZ and declares: “Nothing in 
this treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to 
assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” There are 
currently five regions covered by NWFZ: Latin America and the Caribbean (the 1967 
Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia 
(the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia 
(the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk). In addition to regional NWFZ there are treaties that 
ban the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, Antarctica, Mongolia and on the 
seabed.  
The treaties that establish NWFZ ban the acquisition and detonation of nuclear 
weapons by states in the region and also include protocols ratified by NWS agreeing not 
to threaten or use nuclear weapons against the state-parties to the treaty. Because 
countries in a NWFZ must be confident that no state in the region possesses nuclear 
weapons and that they can provide for their own security without nuclear weapons, these 
negative security guarantees are an essential part of establishing a NWFZ. The treaties 
establishing all five NWFZ, however, include withdrawal clauses, an element that would 
weaken credibility in the Middle East where states have violated nonproliferation 
obligations and threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Nevertheless, “It is now widely 
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recognized that the universality of this regime, which would require attracting to it the 
remaining nuclear threshold states (India, Pakistan and Israel), can be achieved only by 
establishing denuclearized zones in the regions of South Asia and the Middle East.”51   
The Latin America NWFZ established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco can offer 
lessons for a future Middle East NWFZ.52 The entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
was delayed for 30 years due to the nuclear programs pursued by the military regimes of 
Brazil and Argentina and their refusal to join the NPT. When the two countries 
transitioned to democratic rule they put their respective nuclear programs under civilian 
control and began a series of nuclear confidence building measure. In the early 1990s, 
Brazil and Argentina set up a bilateral inspection agency – the Brazil-Argentine Agency 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) – to verify compliance with 
their non-nuclear pledges. Brazil and Argentina signed the NPT as NNWS in 1998 and 
1995, respectively. Every NWFZ relies on a country’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement as a 
compliance and verification mechanism; due to the former nuclear ambitions of Brazil 
and Argentina ABACC is the only bilateral inspection agency and could serve as a model 
for the Middle East.  
 
The Nuclear Supplier Group 
The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is another feature of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. Countries that export nuclear technology play an important role 
in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1974, the NSG was established in 
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response to India’s detonation of a “peaceful bomb” developed with foreign assistance 
intended for peaceful uses. The NSG coordinates members’ export controls to prevent 
peaceful nuclear assistance from being diverted to a weapons program. The NSG 
guidelines prohibit assistance with uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. The 
discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program inspired the NSG’s dual-use guidelines. 
The NSG is a voluntary association and members are not obligated to follow its 
recommendations. Almost all rejections by NSG members of applications for export 
license have concerned states with unsafeguarded nuclear programs. The NSG has 
exempted India from its safeguard requirements, which has dealt a blow to the regimes 
credibility. Sub-state nuclear proliferation rings, such as Pakistan’s AQ Khan network 
that provided enrichment technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya present a serious 
challenge to the efforts of the NSG and nonproliferation regime.  
 The experience with nonproliferation since the NPT entered into force 1970 
suggests that if a state’s leadership chooses to pursue nuclear weapons, its treaty 
obligations and safeguards agreement are not sufficient to deter it. Libya pursued nuclear 
weapons from the AQ Khan network while remaining a NNWS party to the NPT, Syria 
built a clandestine nuclear reactor, Iran pursued uranium enrichment outside of its IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement and North Korea withdrew from the treaty and has conducted 
three nuclear weapons tests. Kenneth Waltz argues, “The historical record indicates that a 
country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. 
Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear 
program.”53  
 
                                                




The Iranian Nuclear Challenge 
The current Iranian nuclear dilemma represents a regional security threat and one 
of the most serious challenges to the global non-proliferation regime. The United States 
and the international community have suspected Iran of harboring nuclear weapons 
ambitions for over a decade. Tehran however has repeatedly denied these accusations and 
insists on its inalienable right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses. As early 
as 1995, however, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned:  
In terms of its organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, 
Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons, which has been 
followed by almost all states that have sought a nuclear weapon. Every 
responsible member of the world community has an interest in seeing 
those efforts fail. There is no room for complacency. Remember Iraq…54  
 
In 2003, the French government submitted a report to the Nuclear Supplier Group 
that argued Iran’s civilian nuclear program was concealing a military program. The report 
concluded, “Iran appears to be ready to develop nuclear weapons within a few years.”55 
Iran’s nuclear facilities are spread across various sites throughout the country making 
them invulnerable to military strikes and aptly suited to concealing any possible military 
dimensions. The agreement reached in the 2013 Geneva Accords has temporarily curbed 
Iran’s nuclear program and subjected it to greater international oversight but a permanent 
resolution that satisfies all international and regional actors may ultimately prove 
unattainable. 
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The Iranian regime has repeatedly responded to accusation that it is seeking to 
acquire nuclear weapons by asserting that all WMD, including nuclear weapons, are 
prohibited by Islamic moral tenets. In October 2003, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production and use of nuclear weapons. Since 
then, Khamenei and other Iranian officials have repeated the statement that Iran is not 
interested in acquiring a nuclear bomb because it is religiously prohibited. Iran supports 
the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East and argues that Israel’s nuclear arsenal 
is the only obstacle to achieving this goal.  
Iran’s history of acquiring nuclear weapons-related technology strongly indicates 
that Tehran’s intention is to develop weapons capability despite its claims to the contrary. 
A 2013 report published by the Institute for Science and International Security states that 
Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium cannot be intended for power production 
because it “exceeds any realistic assessment of Iran’s need for reactor fuel in the short 
and near-term.”56 Iran continues to pursue a strategy of nuclear hedging, maintaining the 
option of developing nuclear weapons while remaining outwardly committed to the NPT 
and the global norm of nonproliferation. Iran’s legitimate nuclear activity is evidence that 
a state can develop nuclear weapons capability and come within grasp of building a bomb 
“without breaking the rules.” The international community, led by the United States, has 
used political and economic coercion in an attempt to deny Iran this capability or, at the 
very least, to provide sufficient notice of Iran’s nuclear decision-making to use force to 
stop it from building a bomb. Current assessments indicate that if Iran stopped 
                                                





cooperating with IAEA inspectors and pursued a “crash program” to build a nuclear 
bomb it could do so within weeks or months. This is referred to as “break out” capability. 
In addition, Iran could “sneak out” and take a path to building a bomb that does not alert 
the international community. This method could utilize a still undisclosed covert uranium 
enrichment facility to provide fissile material for a nuclear bomb.  
Iran’s nuclear program has become a symbol of national autonomy and 
technological achievement. Public opinion polls suggest that a peaceful nuclear program 
enjoys broad public support and as a symbol of its achievement Tehran has printed the 
symbol of the atom on 50,000 rial bills. Of the many countries that maintain nuclear 
power reactors, most rely on foreign suppliers for their nuclear fuel and only a handful 
possess the technology to enrich uranium. Iran believes its ability to produce its own 
reactor fuel is essential to its energy security and despite international pressure the 
Iranian regime is not willing to negotiate an end to its enrichment program. The dual-use 
nature of atomic technology and expertise is at the heart of the Iranian dilemma: uranium 
enrichment and plutonium separation can be used to fuel reactors or to produce fissile 
material for a nuclear bomb.  
Israel, the Gulf state and the West view Tehran’s implacable pursuit of its nuclear 
program and break out capability as a security threat and have pressured Iran to end its 
nuclear program. Since 2006, the Iranian regime has been subject to six United Nations 
Security Council sanctions resolutions and additional sanctions have been imposed on 
Iran’s banking and oil assets by the United States and European Union. Israeli and U.S. 
leaders have maintained that they are keeping “all options on the table” to prevent Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, implying the potential use of military force. Israeli 
 
officials view a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
states perceive Iran’s nuclear program as a greater security threat than Israel’s nuclear 
weapons arsenal.  There is no “smoking gun” to indicate that Iran has ever made the 
political decision to build nuclear weapons but the extent and secrecy of Tehran’s 
program have caused alarm in the international community and among states in the 
region. 
After years of failed attempts to reach a negotiated settlement to resolve the crisis 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, a temporary deal was struck in late 2013. On 
September 14, a phone call between President Barak Obama and his Iranian counterpart 
Hassan Rouhani marked the highest level contact between the two countries since the 
1979 Iranian revolution and began a series of negotiations intended to curb Iran’s nuclear 
program and offer the regime relief from the sanctions that have crippled its economy. In 
October 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council plus Germany) met in Geneva to renew stalled negotiations and in November 
they signed the Joint Plan of Action (JPA). The JPA obligates Iran to blend down its 
stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to 3.5 to 5 percent and subjects its nuclear 
facilities to comprehensive inspections. In addition, Iran has agreed to halt construction 
of its Arak heavy water reactor that could be used to produce plutonium for a bomb. In 
return, sanctions on the Iranian regime have been eased. The JPA is a temporary, six-
month agreement that is intended to pave the way for a more comprehensive, long term 
deal. In January 2014 a report from the IAEA indicated that Iran is in compliance with its 
obligations under the agreement. A former Iranian diplomat contends, “The outcome of 
the nuclear negotiations will have a profound impact on vital issues such as global 
 
nuclear non-proliferation, and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ).”57 Iranian 
officials have portrayed the easing of sanctions and acknowledgement of Iran’s right to a 
civilian nuclear program as a coup for the regime. Israeli officials have been critical of 
the deal and do not believe it addresses their security concerns. In addition, the U.S. 
congress has threatened to derail the deal with Iran by imposing harsher sanctions on Iran 
and linking its nuclear program to Tehran’s continued support for terror groups in the 
Middle East. 
 
History of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi initiated Iran’s nuclear program in 1957 under the 
auspices of President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. The Shah acquired a 
research reactor from the United States and gave the U.S. assurances of his peaceful 
intentions by signing the NPT in 1970. The Shah financed a robust nuclear infrastructure 
and planned to build 23 nuclear power reactors throughout Iran. Shah Pahlavi however 
also pursued a clandestine low-level nuclear weapons program that included studies of 
weapons designs and plutonium separation from spent reactor fuel.58 When asked by a 
French journalist in 1974 if Iran would have nuclear weapons, Shah Pahlavi replied, 
“Without a doubt and sooner than one would think.”59 The current Iranian regime resents 
the nuclear assistance the U.S offered the Shah despite evidence that he was seeking 
nuclear weapons. “The West fully supported the Iranian nuclear program and without a 
doubt, if the Shah were alive today, Iran would have multiple nuclear power plants, 
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industrial scale uranium enrichment facilities, and a nuclear arsenal on a par with those of 
Pakistan, India, and Israel.”60 
After the 1979 Islamic revolution, the U.S., France and Germany cancelled their 
nuclear deals with Iran and the Bushehr power reactor was left unfinished. The new 
Islamic regime abandoned the Shah’s nuclear efforts. The ayatollah Khomeni associated 
Iran’s nuclear program with the Shah’s pro-Western policies and held religious 
objections to nuclear weapons. Many Iranian nuclear scientist went into foreign exile. 
Most estimates however indicate that Iran’s nuclear program was revived in 1984 or 
1985. In a letter written in 1988 in which he consented to a cease-fire with Iraq, the 
Supreme Leader of Iran recommended that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) develop the “ability to make a substantial number of laser and atomic 
weapons.”61 Iran sought foreign support from a range of sources and in 1987 signed a 
nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. Iran also received atomic assistance from 
China, North Korea and Russia. A Russian company completed the construction of the 
Bushehr nuclear reactor, which had been badly damaged by Iraqi strikes during the Iran-
Iraq war. In 1994 and 1995, Tehran bought centrifuge parts from the Pakistani scientist 
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s black market nuclear network.62 
International alarm regarding Iran’s nuclear program intensified in 2002 when an 
exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance in Iran, revealed the 
existence of two undisclosed nuclear facilities, one in Natanz for uranium enrichment and 
another in Arak for the production of heavy water, a component in plutonium production. 
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Both facilities are permitted under Article IV of the NPT but the secrecy of the program 
and the fact that they represent separate paths to nuclear weapons production (uranium 
and plutonium) aroused suspicion and renewed accusations that Tehran was pursuing a 
nuclear weapons program. Iran has resolutely defended its inalienable right to all fuel-
cycle activity and maintains that its nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes. 
According to Iranian officials, the facilities in Natanz and Arak were built secretly, 
“because if they had notified the IAEA that they were building a uranium enrichment 
facility, the U.S. would have definitely prevented them from finalizing the project.”63 The 
assertion that the U.S. and international community apply a double standard to Iran has 
been a recurring theme in Tehran’s rhetoric. Although Iran has the right under Article IV 
to all fuel cycle technology, former IAEA director Hans Blix has stated, “A right to do 
something does not necessarily mean that this right must be exercised.”64  
The EU3 (France, the U.K. and Germany) reached a deal with Tehran in 2003 and 
Iran agreed to temporarily halt its uranium enrichment activity. Iran also agreed to sign 
the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA but never ratified it. 
Iran’s nuclear negotiator told a domestic audience that the deal with the EU3 had bought 
Iran another year to complete its nuclear facility in Isfahan. This deal however fell 
through when the hard-line conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president 
of Iran. In 2006, Iran removed IAEA seals from its gas centrifuges and began enriching 
uranium. In 2009, Iran disclosed the existence of an underground enrichment facility near 
the city of Qom, further heightening regional anxiety and suspicion that Iran was 
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pursuing nuclear weapons capability. The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, 
however, concluded that Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. After several 
visits to Iranian nuclear facilities, IAEA inspectors also concluded that any weapons 
dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program had been halted. “Iranian practices up to November 
2003 resulted in many breaches of Iran’s obligations to comply with its Safeguards 
Agreement, but good progress has been made since that time in Iran’s correction of those 
breaches and the Agency’s ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s declarations.”65  
 
Iran’s Nuclear Incentives 
Iran has paid a high political and economic cost for its pursuit of nuclear 
capability. In addition, Iran’s nuclear program has exposed the regime to the threat of 
force by the United States and Israel. A former Iranian delegate to the IAEA, Ali Akbar 
Salehi, acknowledges the inherent contradiction in pursuing security by developing 
nuclear capability: “Iran cannot buy security by having nuclear weapons which only 
invites more threats against us.”66 A study of nuclear threats made between 1970 and 
2010 concluded: “If a country’s security is measured by the frequency with which it is 
subject to nuclear threats, then the way to maximize security is to remain in compliance 
with international norms and refrain from developing nuclear weapons."67  Why has the 
regime in Tehran resisted pressure to curb its nuclear program despite the high economic 
and security costs? 
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Tehran’s revisionist foreign policy, quest for regional hegemony and animus 
toward Israel often appear irrational or inspired by its revolutionary political ideology but 
over the decades Iran’s policies have been motivated less by religious fervor than rational 
cost-benefit calculations. One of the principle incentives for Iran to pursue nuclear 
weapons capability has been its hostile security environment and perceived threats to 
both the state and the regime. Iran is surrounded by nuclear powers to the east, west and 
north. To Tehran, Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and Pakistan and India’s 1998 
nuclear tests are perceived as security threats and represent the inability of the global 
non-proliferation regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. One 
Middle East analyst argues, “Given its history and its turbulent neighborhood, Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions do not reflect a wholly irrational set of strategic calculations.”68  
In September 1980, shortly after the Iranian revolution, Iraq invaded Iran. The 
eight-year war of attrition that followed formed the Iranian regime’s thinking regarding 
how to maximize its security. Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian 
troops, and the lack of condemnation from the international community, convinced Iran 
of the utility of WMD, including nuclear weapons. Iran revived its nuclear program in 
1984, in the middle of its war with Iraq, indicating that the decision was motivated by 
security concerns. Iranian scholar Shahram Chubin contends: 
Iran has learned from its war with Iraq that, for deterrence to operate, the 
threatening state must be confronted with the certainty of an equivalent 
response. The threat of in-kind retaliation (or worse) deterred Iraq’s use of 
chemical weapons in Desert Storm; it appears that the absence of such a 
retaliatory capability facilitated its decision to use chemical weapons 
against Iran.69  
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Iranian officials frequently cite the injustice of allowing Israel to maintain nuclear 
weapons outside of the NPT and allege that Israel’s nuclear arsenal drives nuclear pursuit 
in the region. Israel and Iran however have never fought a war, do not share a border and 
therefore have no unresolved territorial disputes or clear motive to be adversaries. In fact, 
Israel and Iran, both non-Arab states in the Middle East, were strategic allies during the 
reign of the Shah, and the two countries current rivalry is the product of ideology and not 
structural, balance of power determinants. Iran expert Ray Takeyh argues, “Israel may be 
an ideological affront and a civilizational challenge but it is not an existential threat 
mandating provision of nuclear weapons.”70 Takeyh surveyed speeches by Iranian 
officials and observed that Israel rarely features into these deliberations and that Iran is 
not “inordinately concerned with Israel’s nuclear monopoly.”71 The ability to threaten 
Israel “is a side benefit, not the major impetus” of Iran’s nuclear program.72 
The threat to the Iranian regime from the United States is a more likely incentive 
for Tehran to pursue a nuclear deterrent. The U.S. maintains a policy of support for 
regime change in Iran and provides aid to opposition groups. Iran and the United States 
have had hostile relations since the overthrow of the U.S allied Shah in 1979 and the 
subsequent U.S. embassy hostage crisis. One analyst asserts that Tehran’s efforts to 
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develop nuclear weapons capability “should be viewed through the prism of its rivalry 
with the United States.”73  
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq signaled to Iran America’s willingness to use 
military force to topple a regime that harbors nuclear aspirations. The U.S. maintains 
military bases in Qatar and Bahrain and U.S. warships patrol the Persian Gulf. After the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran found itself bordered on the east and west by 
U.S. troops. Scott Sagan argues that a negative security guarantee from the United States 
is the best policy to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambition.74 The fact that the military 
dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program appear to have ended in 2003, around the time of 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, indicates that deterring regime change is not the primary 
incentive of Iran’s nuclear program. One nuclear weapons analyst argues, “An invasion 
to overthrow the Iranian government is viewed in Tehran as extremely unlikely and is apt 
to remain so for years to come, which reduces the need for a nuclear deterrent.”75 The 
toppling of Saddam Hussein removed Iran’s biggest rival and threat. Iran does not face an 
existential threat from any of its nuclear-armed neighbors requiring it to balance with 
nuclear weapons. 
  Threats to regime survival and territorial integrity do not sufficiently explain 
Iran’s nuclear pursuit. Economic and domestic political factors also motivate Tehran’s 
decision-making. Iran’s political system is more complicated than most states in the 
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region and it is not an autocracy like most Arab states. Iran is not a full democracy but it 
has a system of checks and balances and there are coalitions and factions that compete for 
power. The Supreme Leader, the ayatollah Khamenei, presides over the Iran’s unique 
political system of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) and has the final say over 
foreign policy decisions. But hard-line conservatives, pragmatist and reformists 
politicians compete for influence in the Iran. Etel Solingen believes that the competing 
domestic interests of radicals and reformers “explain the duality in Iran’s nuclear 
behavior – a schizoid foreign policy – in the 1990s and early 2000s.” The current nuclear 
negotiators, president Hassan Rohani and foreign minister represent conservative 
pragmatists whose interests include improving the Iranian economy by integrating into 
the global economy.  
Iran’s nuclear program has isolated the regime and wrecked the economy. 
Conservative political coalitions in Iran, however, benefit from the current situation and 
value Iran’s nuclear program because it perpetuates the country’s isolation. “The 
hardliners today are one of the few segments of Iranian society that is actually benefitting 
from the current economic order.”76 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps controls the 
black market in Iran and imports banned commodities into ports under its control. 
International ostracism serves the economic interests of groups within Iran, whereas 
engagement threatens their interests.  
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability is also motivated by the symbolic 
value and prestige associated with nuclear weapons. All five countries on the United 
Nations Security Council are nuclear weapons states, which reinforces the perception that 
a nuclear bomb is a ticket to the great power status Iran seeks. Dr. Saeed Khatipzadeh, 
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the editor of the Iranian Journal of International Affairs says, “We want to be admitted to 
the nuclear club, we want the prestige, and we want to be respected in the world.”77 
Former conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued, “The Iranian people – 
because of its past culture, its past civilization, its intelligent youth, its human and 
material potential -- has the capacity to quickly become an invincible global power. This 
will happen as soon as it achieves advanced technologies.”78  
 
Iranian Perceptions of the NPT and MENWFZ 
A NWFZ in the Middle East was first proposed by the Shah in 1974 and Iranian 
officials argue that Israel has been the only obstacle to achieving this goal. In an address 
to the Iran disarmament conference in 2012, former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar 
Salehi stated, “The Zionist regime is the only obstacle to the creation of a Middle East 
free of nuclear weapons.” Salehi also suggested, “the world community should put 
pressure on the Zionist regime to join the NPT and allow inspections by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.”79 Despite Iranian rhetoric, support for a Middle East NWFZ 
could have more cynical and deceptive motives and,  “serve Iran’s geopolitical interests 
by providing an opportunity to exploit Arab divisions and shift the focus away from Iran 
toward Israel’s nuclear arsenal, thereby undermining U.S. efforts to stop the Iranian 
nuclear program.”80 Support for a MENWFZ and opposition to Israel is part of the 
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Iranian regimes policy of speaking over the heads of Arab leaders directly to the “Arab 
street.”   
Iranian leaders accuse the international community of applying a double standard 
to Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian diplomat Hossein Moussavian argues that the NPT, 
 
has been used by the West as an instrument of pressure against Iran and to 
falsely accuse Tehran of seeking nuclear weapons. Such tactics serve as a 
means to justify punitive measures and eventual military action. The NPT 
is effectively serving as a platform to deny the legitimate rights of Iran and 
to rally the international community in endorsing and implementing the 
most draconian multilateral and unilateral sanctions ever levied on Iran.81  
 
According to Moussavian, the NPT is “a national security threat” and a tool used by 
“warmongers in the United States” to achieve their real goal of regime change in Iran. 
Moussavian contends that if Iran built a nuclear bomb it could pressure Israel to accept a 
NWFZ in the Middle East. 
 The failure of NWS to work in good faith toward disarmament and the inclusion 
of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines is also perceived by Iranian official as 
legitimizing nuclear weapons and driving proliferation: 
Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to be 
legitimized by treaties like NPT. The American, European, and Russian 
doctrines stress the value of nuclear weapons in national and collective 
defense strategies. Today’s international system is characterized by 
American preeminence and unilateralism; and by the increased role of 
nuclear weapon as a means of political blackmail. These policies foment 
the nuclear arms race, lower the threshold for resorting to nuclear weapons 
and dramatically increase the insecurity and vulnerability of non-nuclear 
weapons states.”82  
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Iranian officials have also made statements about the ability of a nuclear deterrent 
to preserve the Islamic regime and their willingness to use nuclear weapons. In a 2001 
speech Hashemi Rasfsanjani stated:  
If one day the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that 
Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill 
because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy 
everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not 
irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.83  
 
 
Regional Consequences of Iran’s Nuclear Pursuit 
States in the Middle East fear a nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to pursue 
its anti-status quo regional policy with impunity and provide cover for Iranian proxy 
groups in the Levant like Hezbollah and Hamas. Gulf states fear that nuclear weapons 
will enhance Iran’s status and incite their Shiite populations to rebel. Qatar and Bahrain 
both have territorial disputes with Iran. Nuclear weapons scholar Joseph Cirincione 
argues that Iran’s nuclear program could lead to, “A Middle East with not one nuclear-
weapons state, Israel, but four or five.”84 When asked how Saudi Arabia would respond 
to a nuclear Iran, a senior Saudi diplomat stated, “With another nuclear weapon”85 The 
goal of creating a MENWFZ will become unfeasible if Iran crosses the point of no return 
in its development of nuclear weapons. Scott Sagan cautions that reactive nuclear 
proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear capability should not be the international 
community’s primary concern. “Saying that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is 
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worrisome because it encourages nuclear proliferation elsewhere is like telling your kid 
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Israel’s Nuclear Monopoly in the Middle East 
Israel is the only nuclear power in the Middle East and consequently has the most 
to lose from a regional NWFZ. Not an NPT signatory, Israeli leaders have never 
confirmed the existence of nuclear weapons and maintain a posture of “nuclear 
ambiguity.” Understanding and addressing Israel’s threat perception, security doctrine 
and strategic culture are essential to establishing the basic conditions necessary for 
regional arms control and disarmament treaties. Israel exists in a hostile security 
environment and the realist framework of nuclear proliferation explains Israel’s decision 
to develop and maintain a nuclear deterrent. The history of war and conflict and the 
ideological commitment of Arab states and non-state terror groups to the destruction of 
the Jewish state is the greatest incentive for Israel’s nuclear weapons. There is near 
universal consensus among Israeli leaders and scholars that the unique threat to the 
country’s survival justifies an indigenous nuclear deterrent.  
Israelis have little faith in the ability of global arms control treaties to address the 
particular realities of the Middle East. The vast majority of Israelis believe nuclear 
weapons have created stability by persuading Israel’s foes that any effort to annihilate the 
Jewish state will result in their own destruction. One Israeli analyst contends: “As long as 
Jewish sovereignty and Israel's right to equality as a state among the nations is denied, 
the need for a credible deterrent will not end.”87  
 Israel’s Arab neighbors possess quantitative military superiority in terms of 
geographic territory and population size. Israel’s military capability is qualitatively 
superior but it is vulnerable due to its lack of territorial depth and the concentration of its 
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small population in a few major cities. As recently as 1995, a retired Egyptian General 
acknowledged this inherent military asymmetry when he stated: “The combined 
weaponry possessed by the Arab states today exceeds that of Israel; if all of these 
weapons were directed against Israel the Arab states would defeat Israel.”88 From the 
Israeli perspective, nuclear weapons compensate for the regional asymmetry and provide 
a last line of defense in case of a unified Arab attack. “Israeli military planners have 
always considered a scenario in which a united Arab military coalition launched a war 
against Israel with the aim of liberating Palestine and destroying the Jewish state … This 
kind of planning was unique to Israel, as few nations have military contingency plans 
aimed at preventing apocalypse.”89 The option of using nuclear weapons if the country 
faces annihilation is known as the “Samson Option,” named for the biblical character 
who pulled down the roof of a Philistine temple, killing himself along with his captors.  
Israel’s perceived need for an indigenous nuclear deterrent is also driven by 
suspicion of foreign powers’ commitment to defending the Jewish state. Positive security 
guarantees from the United States have persuaded technically capable countries such as 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to exercise nuclear restraint and forgo the nuclear option. 
In the Middle East, Syrian nuclear ambitions were restrained in the 1980s by an 
assurance that, “the Soviet Union would assist Syria militarily, including using tactical 
nuclear weapons if the latter were to be attacked by Israel.”90 Israel’s first Prime Minster 
David Ben-Gurion was convinced of the need for security self-reliance when he failed to 
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gain protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella that offers protection to NATO and 
Japan. With the benefit of hindsight, one analyst observed: “If the U.S. had conducted a 
forward-looking policy to restrain Israel’s proliferation, along with a sure defense 
agreement, we could have prevented the development of Israel’s nuclear arsenal.”91  
The U.S. delivered arms to Israel during the 1973 war when Israel was 
overwhelmed by the Egyptian and Syrian militaries and the U.S. continues to supply 
Israel with arms and advanced military equipment. In 2009, President Shimon Peres 
called the U.S, “Israel’s most important moral and strategic asset.”92 Promises of 
American support however are not considered a credible alternative to an indigenous 
nuclear deterrent. Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon contended: “Israel has to have all 
the elements of power necessary to protect itself independently of outside aid.”93 Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions have heightened anxiety in the Middle East and impacted Israel’s 
strategic calculus concerning its nuclear capability. Any initiative to establish a NWFZ in 
the Middle East will require the U.S. to extend a formal security guarantee to Tel Aviv 
that states that an attack on Israel would be considered an attack on America.   
In addition to security incentives, Israelis have an intangible motive for valuing 
nuclear weapons as a security guarantee. Israeli leaders’ experience of the Holocaust, in 
which European Jewry was decimated while the international community did little or 
nothing to help, shapes Israel’s threat perception and defines its strategic culture. In 
Israel, Iran is often portrayed not as a revisionist regime seeking regional hegemony, but 
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simply as an irrational and ideological regime committed to the destruction of the Jewish 
state. Iranian military parades in which Shahab-3 missiles capable of reaching Israel are 
draped with banners declaring “Israel must be wiped off the map”94 are interpreted 
literally and not as idle threats intended to mobilize domestic support in Iran. Israeli 
journalist Ronen Bergman argues that Israelis have always feared a second Holocaust in 
Israel and as a consequence are inclined to hear “echoes of the Wannssee Conference in 
Tehran’s inflammatory rhetoric.”95 Defense minister Ehud Barak told an Israeli 
journalist, “This is not about some abstract concept. The Iranians are, after all, a nation 
whose leaders have set themselves the strategic goal of wiping Israel off the map.”96 
Public opinion polls indicate that Israelis perceive a potential nuclear Iran as an 
existential threat incapable of being deterred from initiating a nuclear first-strike.97 In the 
face of threats to wipe it off the map, Israelis value a nuclear deterrent as the ultimate 
security guarantee.  
This “holocaust-imbued sense of threat” 98 explains Israel’s strategy of using 
military force to deny regional adversaries nuclear weapons capability. After the 1981 
strike against Iraq’s nuclear reactor, Menachem Begin declared, “I will not be the man in 
whose time there will be a second Holocaust.”99 The policy of preventing regional foes 
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from achieving their nuclear ambitions is called the “Begin Doctrine.” Several other 
Israeli leaders have used analogies to the Holocaust to explain the rationale for Israel’s 
security strategy. Ernst David Bergman, the first chairman of the Israeli Atomic Energy 
Commission, believed Israel’s nuclear deterrent would, “assure that we shall never again 
be led like lambs to the slaughter.”100 Prime Minister Golda Meir believed she was 
responsible, “to act in such a way that Jews who died in the gas chambers would be the 
last Jews to die without defending themselves.”101 Israeli leaders’ perception of the utility 
of a nuclear deterrent can be understood through the prism of the Jewish experience of 
the Holocaust and the existential threats coming from its current adversaries.  
 
Israel’s Nuclear Ambiguity 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Defense Minister Shimon Peres were 
strong advocates of an Israeli nuclear option and both helped initiate Israel’s nuclear 
weapons program shortly after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Ben-Gurion and Peres were 
convinced that the end of the war was only a respite for Israel and that Arab countries 
would continue to attempt to destroy the Jewish state. In the 1950s, military and strategic 
developments in the Middle East continued to move Israel’s defense strategy closer to a 
nuclear weapons option. The Arab regimes enjoyed Soviet military and political support, 
while Israel was under an arms embargo by all great powers, including the U.S and the 
U.K. Israel’s isolation in the international community manifested itself in hostility and 
ostracism in the U.N. In 1955, Egypt announced a large arms deal with Czechoslovakia 
that greatly increased its military capability, further increasing Israel’s insecurity and 
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anxiety. The 1956 Suez Crisis ended with a Soviet threat of nuclear attack if Israel did 
not withdraw from Sinai. The Suez Crisis not only brought about a Soviet nuclear threat, 
“it had a larger unanticipated consequence, nuclear proliferation in two countries, France 
and Israel.”102 
France and Israel shared a strategic opposition to Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel 
Nasser who supported the Algerian armed resistance to French colonial rule. France 
supplied Israel with arms and advanced military technology beginning in 1955 and the 
two countries also cooperated closely on their respective nuclear programs. At the time 
Israel initiated its nuclear program, Arab states had basic chemical weapons but had not 
yet pursued nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear program was motivated by the threat of 
Arab conventional arms and the superpower threats to use nuclear weapons in the Middle 
East. In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel was an ideal candidate for a nuclear weapons option 
and the decision to build a bomb is estimated to have been made around 1962 or 1963.103  
On December 20, 1960, David Ben-Gurion publicly announced the existence of 
Israel’s French-supplied nuclear reactor at the insistence of President Charles de Gaulle. 
Three days later Nasser gave an impassioned speech at Port Said in which he vowed that 
Egypt would pursue its own nuclear weapons program.  
They say that Israel is making an atom bomb. Our reply to this is that such 
talk increases Arab determination to adhere to Arab nationalism and Arab 
unity. If Israel can make an atom bomb, we can also make an atom bomb. 
We will under no circumstances permit Israel to be our superior. We will 
always be superior to Israel, no matter what the cost and the sacrifices 
involved.104 
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Egypt initiated a nuclear weapons program, which it pursued throughout the 1960s and 
up until Nasser’s death in 1970.  
The Kennedy administration urged Israel to curb its nuclear ambitions and allow 
regular American inspections of the nuclear facilities at Dimona in the south of Israel. 
Kennedy worried that Israel’s nuclear program would either provoke other states in the 
region to pursue nuclear weapons or lead to intervention by the Soviet Union. In a 
meeting with President Kennedy, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion stated that, although 
he appreciated Kennedy’s concern about Israel’s nuclear program, the real danger was 
from the “destructive conventional weapons in the hands of neighboring governments 
which openly proclaim their intention to attempt the annihilation of Israel.”105 In 1963, 
when President Kennedy asked Shimon Peres about Israel’s nuclear program, Peres 
answered, “We will not be the first ones to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle 
East.”106 Peres’ improvised and ambiguous answer is still Israel’s official posture on its 
nuclear weapons.  
In 1979, Israel’s strategy of nuclear ambiguity was solidified during a meeting 
between Richard Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. According to the Meir-
Nixon pact, as long as Israel did not test a nuclear weapon or publicly declare itself a 
nuclear power, the U.S. would tolerate Israel’s nuclear program.107 This agreement 
between U.S. and Israeli leaders continues to the present day and is intended to prevent 
the erosion of the nonproliferation regime and provide the U.S. diplomatic cover from 
accusations of a nuclear double standard. Israel’s undisclosed nuclear weapons have 
given it political leverage vis-à-vis the United States as a result of the latter’s interest in 
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preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In the 1960s, while its nuclear 
capability was still ambiguous, “Israel was in a good position to win important 
concessions by playing on the possibility of ‘going publicly nuclear' if its situation 
became desperate. This consideration clearly played an important role, spoken or 
unspoken, in negotiations over conventional arms supplies.”108 Richard Betts has argued 
that conventional military aid is a legitimate and effective tool to restrain states’ nuclear 
ambitions.109  
As a result of its bargain with the United States, Israel’s nuclear posture is 
distinctive from all other nuclear weapon states. Israel has never tested a nuclear bomb 
(not that can be confirmed with certainty)110 and does not have an explicit nuclear 
deterrence doctrine. Israel has never deployed nuclear weapons in military exercises and 
Israeli leaders still refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a nuclear deterrent. 
Nonetheless, Israel is believed to have built nuclear weapons by the late sixties, 
becoming the sixth country to join the nuclear club.  
Israel’s unique nuclear posture is referred to as nuclear “ambiguity” or “opacity.” 
The term used in Hebrew, hamimut, “denotes a state of being vague, dim, indistinct or 
obtuse.”111 During the sixties and seventies Israel’s nuclear program could be described 
as ambiguous; Arab states believed Israel was developing a nuclear capability but had not 
yet built a bomb and Israeli officials continued to deny their interest in nuclear weapons. 
After the 1967 Six Day War, Israel changed to a “bomb in the basement” posture, which 
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implies that nuclear weapons had been built, but not disclosed. This term is still used to 
describe Israel’s nuclear capability. 
By the 1970s, reports began to surface confirming the existence of nuclear 
weapons in Israel and the term “ambiguity” became an increasingly inaccurate 
description of Israel’s nuclear policy. In 1974, a leaked CIA memo stated the belief that 
Israel had already built nuclear weapons. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, these 
reports provoked a renewed discussion among Arabs of Israel’s nuclear capability. After 
the Israeli strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan 
issued the clearest statement on Israel’s nuclear posture: “We don’t have any atomic 
bombs now but we have the capacity; we can do that in a short time.”112 Ariel Levite 
describes the period between 1977 and 1986 as, “characterized by the emergence of a 
high degree of certainty within the Arab world regarding the existence of nuclear 
weapons in Israel and a widespread belief that Israel might use such weapons in a case of 
last resort.”113 At this point, Israel’s nuclear policy changed to one of opacity: Avner 
Cohen writes, “Nuclear opacity is a situation in which a state’s nuclear capability has not 
been acknowledged but is recognized in a way that influences other nations perceptions 
and actions.”114  
In 1986, testimony and photographs obtained from Mordechai Vanunu, a former 
technician at the Dimona nuclear reactor, were published in the London Sunday Times 
and confirmed for the first time that Israel was able to chemically separate plutonium at 
the Dimona facility. Arabs responded to Vanunu’s revelation with accusations that this 
was an instance of Israel attempting to release information about its military capability to 
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bolster the psychological impact of its nuclear deterrent. There is no longer anything truly 
opaque or ambiguous about Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons but Israeli leaders 
continue to deny the existence of nuclear weapons.  
 
Has Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent Been Effective? 
Has Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons served as a deterrent in conflicts with its 
Arab adversaries? In the 1960s, Shimon Peres argued that Arab uncertainty regarding 
Israel’s capability can serve as a deterrent: “I know this suspicion is a deterrent force. 
Why, then, should we allay these suspicions? Why should we enlighten them?”115 The 
conventional wisdom holds that Israel’s nuclear weapons have achieved three important 
objectives: 1) deterring a unified Arab attack since the 1967 Six Day War; 2) changing 
the goal of Arab states away from the destruction of Israel and; 3) creating the conditions 
necessary to establish peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Israel armed its nuclear 
weapons on three occasions: in June 1967, in October 1973 and during the Gulf War in 
1991. 
Shimon Peres credits Israel’s nuclear posture with bringing Anwar Sadat to 
Jerusalem to sign a peace accord in 1979 and Sadat himself allegedly confirmed this 
notion in a conversation with Israeli defense minister Ezer Weizman.116 After paying the 
huge costs of the 1973 War, Egypt decided that Israel was not going to be destroyed, and 
that peace and normalized relations were the only alternative. Peres has said that Israel’s 
nuclear option does not exist to create another Hiroshima, but in order to promote another 
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Oslo (peace accord).117 More recently alternative perspectives argue that Israel’s opaque 
nuclear posture has not served as a deterrent and has provoked a conventional and 
unconventional arms race in the Middle East. 
As stated above, Israel armed its nuclear weapons on three occasions: in June 
1967, in October 1973 and during the Gulf War in 1991. Guy Ziv argues that Israel’s 
nuclear deterrent limited the objectives of Egypt and Syria in the 1973 October War to 
retaking the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, territory lost in 1967. Ziv writes:  
An Egyptian former general told me ... that the Egyptian army’s plans for 
the opening stages of the 1973 October War were confined to the Suez 
Canal zone for fear that if they penetrated Israel further, the Israeli leaders 
may have felt sufficiently threatened to use nuclear weapons.118  
 
Shlomo Aronson also argues that Israel’s nuclear deterrent has impacted the course of the 
conflict between Israel and its neighbors. Yair Evron, however, believes that Israel’s 
conventional deterrence has been more effective in deterring Arab aggression. 
Questions about the efficacy of Israel’s nuclear deterrent were raised in 1991 after 
Saddam Hussein targeted Israeli cities with Scud missile. At the beginning of the Gulf 
War, Israeli politicians and military leaders publicly stated they would respond to an Iraqi 
attack with overwhelming force. Months before the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein 
had made a speech in which he threatened to use chemical weapons against Israel. One 
observer argues, “Saddam stopped short of using nonconventional weapons, and thus, 
while Israel’s conventional deterrence suffered a certain setback, its nonconventional 
(nuclear) deterrence remained intact.”119 Zeez Maoz, a nuclear skeptic, argues that 
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Saddam’s use of Scud missiles to target Israel marked an overwhelming deterrence 
failure.  
A 2010 Foreign Affairs article argues that Israel’s nuclear ambiguity has been 
ineffective and has not had any impact on the strategic calculus of Israel’s enemies. “It 
did not deter the Egyptians and Syrians from invading Israel in 1973, Iraq from launching 
missiles on Israel in 1991. None of these attacks were kept at bay by a balance of military 
force that overwhelmingly favored Israel”120 In addition, since the peace treaties with 
Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and the disarming of Iraq in the 1990s, Israel’s major 
security threat comes from terrorism and low-scale conflict against which nuclear 
weapons are all but useless. Nuclear deterrents can only prevent full-scale, conventional 
war. 
 
Should Israel End its Policy of Nuclear Opacity? 
Arab states have pressured Israel to end it policy of ambiguity and adopt a more 
transparent nuclear policy. Israelis have also increasingly begun to argue that Israel’s 
denial of its nuclear weapons has outlived its usefulness and has a detrimental affect of 
security and Israeli democracy. Israel’s nuclear opacity, however, has decreased pressure 
on Arab states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and mitigated the incentives to 
proliferate. An explicit Israeli nuclear policy would put Arab leaders under increased 
domestic pressure to end Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly and could cause nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East before a verifiable NWFZ could be established. An overt 
Israeli nuclear deterrent would also erode the credibility of the nonproliferation regime 
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and strain relations with the United States. In order to establish a NWFZ in the Middle 
East, however, Israel has to ultimately acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons. 
One benefit of disclosing nuclear weapons is to give “no first use” assurances to 
states in the region, guaranteeing that Israel will not use nuclear weapons unprovoked. 
This could reduce tension regarding Israel’s nuclear posture and would bring Israel’s 
military doctrine in line with its repeated assurance not to be the first country to introduce 
nuclear weapons into the region. In addition, an opaque nuclear posture is better at 
deterring a conventional military attack, rather than a chemical or biological attack, 
which could be launched without warning and, “a nuclear posture focused on deterring 
other WMDs would provide a much better platform for arms control.”121  
In 2003, the Israeli government commissioned Project Daniel to assess the 
strategic threats to Israel. One of the contributors, professor Louis Rene Beres, proposes 
that an end to Israel’s nuclear ambiguity is necessary to deter Iran and convince Tehran 
that Israel’s nuclear weapons are invulnerable. He argues:  
Any Iranian judgments about Israel’s capability and willingness to 
retaliate with nuclear weapons would therefore depend largely upon some 
prior Iranian knowledge of these weapons, including their degree of 
protection from surprise attack, and also their capacity to “punch-through” 
Iranian active and passive defenses.122  
 
Beres argues that an explicit Israeli nuclear doctrine can accomplish these goals and 
allow Israel to create a formal nuclear doctrine that establishes credible casus belli that 
can be communicated to adversaries, such as Iran. None of this can be done while Israel’s 
leaders maintain silence regarding their nuclear deterrent. 
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Avner Cohen and Zeez Maoz both argue that Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity 
has negatively impacted Israeli democracy. After Cohen published his seminal history of 
Israel’s nuclear program, Israel and the Bomb, he did not return to Israel for five years. 
When he finally did he was threatened with arrest and interrogated for over 50 hours by 
military officials. In Israel, any writings about security policy, and especially the 
country’s nuclear weapons, are subject to state censorship. Freedom House scores Israel’s 
media as “partly free” for this reason. Most Israelis, however, accept the secrecy 
surrounding Israel’s nuclear weapons and perceive the actions of Mordechai Vanunu as 
espionage.  
 
Israeli Perceptions of the NPT and Middle East NWFZ 
Israelis who support an end to the policy of nuclear ambiguity do not believe 
Israel should renounce its nuclear weapons and disarm. Arab states, on the other hand, 
have been calling for Israel to join the NPT since it entered into force in 1970. Israel 
would have to adopt a policy of nuclear transparency in order to sign the NPT and, since 
the NPT cannot allow a sixth nuclear state, transparency would strengthen the case for 
disarmament. One Israeli scholar observes:   
The conflation of the two conceptually distinct messages underscores that 
the parties voicing them have little interest in transparency as such, nor are 
they seeking a confidence-building measure and/or a means to enhance the 
extent of Israel’s cooperation with the international community. Rather, 
they consider the removal of ambiguity a move that will significantly 
boost their case that Israel must join the NPT—and of course disarm.123  
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In response to the Egyptian campaign to press Israel to sign the NPT and to give up its 
deterrent, Israeli leaders argue that Israel is the only country threatened with annihilation 
and that it must, therefore, maintain its nuclear deterrent. 
The international focus on Iran’s nuclear pursuit has provoked claims of a double 
standard. Why should Israel be allowed to maintain its nuclear weapons while Iran is 
refused the same right? This logic is used by those that believe Israel should be pressured 
to join the NPT and disarm. Iran, however, is a member of the NPT that took the decision 
to remain non-nuclear, whereas Israel chose to remain outside the treaty, which it 
believes cannot address its unique security concerns. In addition, Israel has been a 
responsible nuclear state and has not threatened its neighbors with a nuclear strike, or 
exported nuclear technology to other states, as the Pakistani AQ Khan network did. Israel 
cooperates with the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines. Israel has also signed (but not 
ratified) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has established a station near 
the Dead Sea as part of the international network to monitor compliance. 
Proposals for linking Iran’s progress on nonproliferation and Israel relinquishing its 
nuclear deterrent have been received with cynicism in Israel.  
The dismal compliance record of Israel’s neighbors with their NPT 
nonproliferation obligations makes Israelis pessimistic about the regimes ability to 
address Israeli security and wary that the NPT is losing its relevance and “perhaps even 
becoming counterproductive in today’s world.” The norm of nonproliferation serves 
Israel’s interest but failures to enforce compliance with states’ nonproliferation 
obligations make the treaty increasingly irrelevant in the Middle East. A universal treaty 
is incompatible with the realities of the Middle East and if Israel gave up its nuclear 
 
weapons it would destabilize the region and threaten Israeli security. Israelis support 
regional arms control and disarmament solutions and believe the NPT “is detached from 
the realities of security in the Middle East.”124  
Nonetheless, Israel’s existence outside the nonproliferation regime is problematic; 
Israel benefits from the NPT and its norm of nonproliferation and yet it is not constrained 
by the regime. Avner Cohen argues that the issue of NPT universality and compliance are 
linked and that “only a universal, action-oriented nonproliferation regime will command 
the respect of the world community and best address the noncompliance question.”125 
Cohen argues that the NPT can address the problem of universality by creating an “NPT 
for non-members.”126 A separate protocol for Israel, India and Pakistan – all de facto 
nuclear weapon states –would have the benefit of increasing cooperation with 
international nuclear export controls and prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons. 
Avner believes this is the only solution because it is politically impossible to admit three 
more nuclear weapon states to the NPT and none of the three de facto nuclear states can 
be expected to give up their nuclear weapons.  
The incorporation of states existing outside the NPT should not be applied to 
NNWS that violate their obligations or withdraw from the treaty: India, Pakistan and 
Israel never signed the NPT and therefore recognizing them as nuclear powers does not 
legitimize nuclear proliferation. Cohen believes that the three de facto nuclear states 
should also commit themselves to the goal of disarmament. In addition to disarmament, 
integrating Israel into the NPT and acknowledging its nuclear arsenal would allow it to 
                                                
124 Ariel E. Levite, “Global Zero: An Israeli Vision of Realistic Idealism,” The Washington 
Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2010): 157–68. 
125 Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham, “An NPT for Non-Members,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 60, no. 3 (2004): 40–44. 
126 Ibid. 
 
cooperate on global test ban treaties and a proposed fissile material cut-off treaty. Israel, 
according to Avner, would benefit by cooperating with the nonproliferation regime and 
“could gain an important element of legitimacy for its program and for its security 
posture.”127 Not all Israeli scholars agree with this position. Emily Landau, an Israeli 
nuclear weapons scholar, argues, “ending ambiguity will not result in Israel being 
accepted as an openly declared nuclear state, but will, rather, only contribute to mounting 
pressure for it to join the NPT - namely, to accept total disarmament.”128  
From the Israeli perspective, arms control and disarmament can only occur once 
relations in the Middle East have been improved. Israel relies on its nuclear weapons for 
its security and discussions of nuclear disarmament are not a priority. Nonproliferation 
and security are its priorities. Nuclear disarmament will “not reduce the security anxiety 
that has led to their acquisition (or to seeking their umbrella by ones’ allies) in the first 
place, and in fact might even heighten it.”129 The Arab states and Iran take the opposite 
view and believe the process to regional peace and security begins with Israel disarming 
and signing the NPT. 
Israeli officials have formally endorsed the goal of nuclear disarmament and the 
vision of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. The decision to support eventual 
disarmament was first expressed during the 1992 Arms Control and Regional Security 
(ACRS) working group and has since been reiterated. In 1995, Israeli Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres declared, “Give me peace, and we will give up the atom. That’s the whole 
story. If we achieve regional peace, I think we can make the whole Middle East free of 
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any nuclear threat.”130 In 1980, Israel submitted a proposal to the UN for a Middle East 
NWFZ that would not require membership in the NPT. A statement by Foreign Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir was read during a meeting of the UN General Assembly and expressed 
the fundamental Israeli assumptions on regional arms control: 
Israel has consistently supported resolutions of the General Assembly 
aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. This global problem, 
we believe, can best be solved by way of negotiated regional 
arrangements. Hence, since 1975, Israel has consistently advocated the 
establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in the Middle East on the 
Tlatelolco model. Israel believes that an international conference of all the 
states in the region should be held, leading to the conclusion of formal, 
contractual, multilateral convention between all states of the region.131 
 
Arab states hesitated to negotiate with Israel for fear that it would tacitly imply 
recognition of the Jewish state, a political liability for Arab leaders. Egypt, after all, had 
been expelled from the Arab League as a result of its 1979 peace treaty with the Jewish 
state. The dovish Israeli diplomat Abba Eban expressed skepticism regarding the logic of 
a MENWFZ in general and questioned its relevance to the Middle East: 
A region declaring itself ‘nuclear free’ is very similar to a nation 
declaring itself ‘neutral.’ If some neutral countries have not been 
invaded, such as Switzerland in the two world wars, it would be hard to 
prove that this was because of their declared neutrality. It was either 
because there was no strategic necessity for a belligerent to violate their 
frontiers, or because the neutrality was useful to the belligerents or 
because they had prudently modeled themselves on the example of the 
porcupine; bristly animals are not a tempting target for a wrestling 
match. Nuclear-free zones, like neutrality, are a unilateral hope, not a 
prescription for safety.132  
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Professor Louis Rene Beres is a harsh critic of Arab proposals for a MENWFZ. 
He cites military theorist Carl von Clausewitz opinion that in security doctrines “mass 
matters” and Arab states possess mass in terms of geography and population. Israel must 
therefore internally balance by maintaining nuclear weapons. These “equalizing elements 
of national power” are essential to Israel’s self defense and survival. Beres says that 
efforts to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East are disingenuous and that Barak Obama’s 
support for nuclear disarmament is naïve. Beres concedes that a Middle East free of both 
nuclear weapons and all WMD would benefit all countries in the region but he believes 
that verification of compliance with nuclear prohibition would be impossible. Louis Rene 
Beres argues that Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal is not destabilizing the region: “In 
the Middle East, the core problem has absolutely nothing to do with Israel’s nuclear 
weapons and posture, assets which have never been used to threaten or even intimidate 
recalcitrant enemies. Rather, the peril remains a persisting and unreconstructed Jihadist 
commitment to ‘excising the Jewish cancer.’”133 
South Africa is the only country that has ever built and then renounced nuclear 
weapons. The security environment of the Middle East does not provide Israeli leaders 
with any incentive to relinquish their nuclear deterrent. Israel would seek recognition of 
its right to exist as a Jewish state and full diplomatic recognition before it would begin 
steps to establish a NWFZ. Even in the event that states in the Middle East agree to a 
credible MENWFZ with an ironclad compliance and verification mechanism, there is 
always the possibility of Israel rearming. In the words of Thomas Schelling: “Short of 
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Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iraq 
Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has the unfortunate distinction of having been the 
target of preventive strikes by two countries (Iran and Israel) as well as the ostensible 
justification for history’s first counter-proliferation war and occupation. In addition, the 
unforeseen discovery of Iraq’s highly developed nuclear capability in the aftermath of the 
1991 Gulf War resulted in years of crippling economic sanctions and the most 
comprehensive and intrusive weapons inspections ever conducted. Saddam Hussein’s 
deception and ability to pursue a nuclear weapons program while under IAEA safeguards 
dealt a blow to the non-proliferation regime and inspired the drafting of the IAEA Model 
Additional Protocol to prevent future clandestine proliferation. If not for Saddam 
Hussein’s strategic miscalculation, Iraq might well be a nuclear weapon state today. 
In August 1990, the Iraqi military invaded and annexed Kuwait in a bold bid to 
seize the country’s oil resources and financial assets. Saddam Hussein, however, 
misjudged the international response to his aggression and Iraq was condemned by the 
international community, including every Arab states with the exception of Jordan and 
Yemen. After six months of sanctions failed to coerce the Iraqi dictator to withdraw his 
troops from Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized “all 
necessary measures” to expel the Iraqi forces. On January 17, 1991, a coalition of 
countries led by the United States mobilized to restore the status quo in the Gulf.   
On April 3, 1991, after Iraq’s defeat, UNSC resolution 687 ordered that Iraq be 
disarmed of all WMD and missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. The resolution 
mandated the IAEA with the task of finding and destroying Iraq’s nuclear weapons 
facilities. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established 
 
to disarm Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and to assist the IAEA Action 
Team with the Iraqi nuclear file. Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tariq Aziz claimed 
UNSC resolution 687 contained “iniquitous and vengeful measures”135 but Saddam 
Hussein had no choice but to agree to the terms of the cease-fire. Iraq was the first 
country ever to be prohibited from possessing highly enriched uranium and plutonium. 
This severe restriction on Iraq’s sovereignty was only enforceable by the backing of the 
UNSC and the tacit and credible threat of both harsher economic sanctions or military 
force if Saddam did not comply.  
The work of the IAEA Action Group ultimately revealed that Saddam Hussein 
had been pursuing a dedicated clandestine nuclear weapons program that used elaborate 
schemes and stratagems to avoid detection by IAEA inspectors and national intelligence 
services. The IAEA Action Team estimated that Iraq was only 18 to 24 months away 
from having a crude nuclear device and three to four years away from a deliverable 
weapon.136 After the arduous and often dangerous job of disarming Iraq, a comprehensive 
ongoing monitoring and verification system was set up to ensure Iraq’s continued 
compliance with its NPT non-proliferation obligations.  
 
Saddam’s Deception 
Iraq signed and ratified the NPT in 1969 and began its determined pursuit of 
nuclear weapons capability shortly thereafter. In 1974, then-Vice President Saddam 
Hussein travelled to France to negotiate a deal with France and promised cheap oil in 
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return for a nuclear reactor. Prior to his trip to Paris, Saddam told a Lebanese journalist 
that French assistance to Iraq would be "the first concrete step toward the production of 
the Arabic atomic weapon" and that Iraq needed to obtain nuclear weapons in order to 
counter Israel's nuclear arsenal.137  
 In 1976, Iraq purchased an Osiris reactor (called Osiraq in Iraq) from France that 
ran on weapons-grade uranium fuel and by 1979 Iraq had also begun a plutonium 
reprocessing facility with Italian assistance.138 Iraq had initially attempted to purchase a 
graphite-moderated reactor that would have produced enough plutonium to build five to 
eight nuclear warheads per year.139 The French, however, would not consent to the sale. 
Iraqi defector and nuclear scientist Khidir Khamza later revealed, “Our hidden agenda 
was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to develop weapons-
grade plutonium.”140 Iraqi scientists believed that they would be able to produce five to 
seven kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year from the Osiraq reactor.141 (11 
kilograms of plutonium constitutes the critical mass necessary to create a chain reaction 
and nuclear explosion). Iraq’s nuclear program was perceived to be a threat by some 
states in the region and Iraqi facilities were targeted by preventive strikes.  
In September 1980, the Iranian air force crossed into Iraq and bombed the Osiraq 
reactor, located in the city of al-Tuwaitha, 10 miles south of Baghdad. The Iranian 
operation was the first ever preventive strike on a nuclear reactor but it was unsuccessful 
and caused only minor damage. Eight months later, in June 1981, Israeli jets bombed and 
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destroyed the Osiraq reactor just before it was scheduled to go critical. The Israeli 
operation was condemned by the UNSC and General Assembly.  
 Analysts do not agree on the consequences of the Israeli preventive strike. Some 
believe the attack delayed Iraq’s nuclear program and was the deciding factor in Iraq’s 
failure to produce a nuclear bomb before the 1991 Gulf War. This is due to the fact that 
after 1981 Iraq switched from a plutonium production to a more technically difficult and 
expensive uranium production program.142 Former U.S. National Security Council 
member Kenneth Pollack argued that the Osiraq raid,  
merely set back Saddam’s nuclear program, but in doing so, it ensured that 
Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon in time for either the Iran-Iraq War 
or the Gulf War, and that was just enough of a delay to prevent him from 
ever acquiring one.143 
 
Some scholars, however, argue that Israel’s strike had the unintended consequence of 
increasing Saddam’s commitment to his nuclear program and “raised Saddam’s 
estimation of the importance of acquiring nuclear weapons.”144 Others contend the Iraqi 
nuclear program was for peaceful purposes or that the Osiraq reactor could not have 
produced enough plutonium for a nuclear bomb, especially while under both IAEA and 
bilateral safeguards. Former Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri called the idea that the 
Osiraq reactor could have served a weapons program “delusional.”145 Khadduri argues 
that Iraq’s nuclear program only began after the Israeli raid. After the Israeli strike 
Saddam Hussein was advised by his top nuclear scientist not to withdraw from the NPT 
in order to better conceal his aim of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. “If we walk out 
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now” Saddam adviser reasoned, “our enemies will say this is proof of our real intentions. 
I say we keep them guessing. Better we stay inside and learn how to deceive them.” 
Iraq invested considerable energy into deceiving the IAEA and national 
intelligence services. In order to access the IAEA, Saddam Hussein created the position 
of “scientific attaché” at the Iraqi embassy in Vienna. A brother of Saddam's senior 
bodyguard was appointed to this position and was able to garner information about “the 
role of inspectors in uncovering clandestine programs, how information given to 
inspectors was controlled, and how limited their leverage was.”146 An Iraqi physicist 
became an IAEA inspector in order to learn how Iraq could avoid the detection of its 
clandestine nuclear program. Khidir Hamza suggests, “the understanding that gradually 
emerged from a closer relationship to the IAEA was how weak and easily manipulated 
the agency was.”147 
Saddam employed less devious methods to conceal his illicit nuclear program and 
hid some illicit facilities in plain site. Al-Tuwaitha, the site of Iraq’s safeguarded nuclear 
reactor, also housed Iraq’s uranium enrichment program. One hundred foot-high berms 
were built and trees were planted to prevent inspectors from spotting these undeclared 
buildings and inspectors were led along paths that did not reveal the buildings. Parts and 
equipment for the nuclear program were imported using a series of shell companies that 
managed to avoid eliciting suspicion. Iraq took advantage of the culture at the IAEA of 
accepting a state’s word regarding the completeness and correctness of its declaration of 
nuclear materials and facilities. Rolf Ekeus, the head of UNSCOM, later explained why 
IAEA inspectors missed signs of Iraq’s elaborate deception: 
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The IAEA inspected Iraq in the context of the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty and the Safeguard arrangements, which are linked to that treaty. So, 
their inspectors went regularly, and regularly means a couple of times per 
year, to visit the declared reactor and declared facilities, nuclear facilities, 
taking samples and counting the amount of fissionable material there and 
the amount of nuclear material as good bookkeepers, but they were not 
tasked to investigate something outside of the declared sites. They had no 
chance to detect anything … I’m afraid to say that the IAEA reporting 
gave high marks to Iraq.148 
 
The former director of the IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) agrees that 
Iraq’s deception of the IAEA was the result of the organization’s institutional myopia.  
Back then, it seemed that the international community was convinced that 
NPT non-nuclear-weapon States would remain committed to their pledges, 
and thus, the Agency’s role would simply be the verification of the State’s 
declared nuclear materials and installations. The mistake of the whole 
community was not to acknowledge that a meaningful verification system 
must implement measures aimed at detecting if a State was trying to 
deceive the system via the conduct of undeclared activities.149 During the 




Under the terms of UNSC resolution 687, Iraq was required to provide 
declarations outlining the types, numbers, and locations of all its WMD and related 
facilities, which would then be verified by UN inspections teams. During the first two 
years after the Gulf War, however, Iraqi officials did not cooperate with UNSCOM and 
the declarations made by Iraqi officials were incomplete and did not reveal the extent of 
the chemical and nuclear program. Moreover, they denied outright the weaponization of 
biological agents, a fact that was later disproven.  
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In addition to false declarations, Iraqi officials also used confrontation and 
intimidation and counterintelligence to prevent the intrusive inspections that were the 
terms of the ceasefire. UN inspector David Kay recalled: 
Inspectors were awakened with telephoned threats; obscene and 
threatening notes were slipped under hotel doors; hotel rooms were 
ransacked; verbal abuse on the street and at inspection sites became 
common; on several occasions inspectors were physically attacked by 
outraged Iraqi "civilians"; UN vehicles were bombed and tires slashed; 
and shots were fired over the heads of inspectors as a team photographed 
Iraq's secret uranium enrichment equipment.150 
 
In October 1991, UNSCOM reported to the UNSC that: ‘The elements of 
misinformation, concealment, lack of co-operation and violation of the privileges and 
immunities of the Special Commission and IAEA have not created any trust in Iraq’s 
intentions.”151 In August, the UNSC passed resolution 707, which declared Iraq to be in 
“material breach” of the ceasefire and demanded full disclosure of all WMD activities 
and cooperation with weapons inspectors. Only when the UN Security Council threatened 
Baghdad with military action did the Iraqis finally back down and allow full inspections 
to take place.  
In 1995, Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s brother-in-law and the head 
of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, defected to Jordan. 
Anticipating that Kamel would reveal the truth about the extent of Iraq’s nuclear 
and WMD program during the 1980s, Iraq made boxes of documents available, 
albeit in an unusual manner, to UN inspectors. Iraqi officials led Rolf Ekeus and 
members of his monitoring team to a “chicken farm” where they were told Kamel 
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had stowed the documents. The Iraqi’s made the implausible argument that Kamel 
alone was responsible for the pursuit of WMD. The documents recovered at the 
chicken farm revealed that prior to the Gulf War Saddam, in fear for his regime’s 
survival, pursued a “crash program” to extract enough high enriched uranium to 
build a bomb that could be used against Israel or the U.S. led coalition forces.152 
Ekeus told reporters that the documents confirmed that Iraq had pursued a crash 
program and provided important information on the Iraqi uranium enrichment 
program, as well as a secret missile program, biological weapons testing and 
chemical weapons production.153 Khadir Hamza later stated that he thought the 
nuclear crash program was intended to produce a bargaining tool but that Saddam 
stated, “he was going to drop it on someone.”154 
In 1997, all of the American inspectors were kicked out of Iraq and in November 
1998 Iraq refused to let any UN inspectors into Iraq, claiming that UNSCOM had served 
as a front for U.S. espionage. In December, the U.S. and U.K conducted bombing 
missions in Iraq in an attempt to force Saddam to comply with the terms of the 1991 
ceasefire agreement. UNSCOM was disbanded in December 1999. In December, the 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) was 
tasked with carrying out any future inspections in Iraq. Unlike the resolution establishing 
UNSCOM, UNMOVIC was now specifically authorized under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, leaving no doubt that compliance was mandatory and was backed by the threat 
of military force.  
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On 8 November 2002, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1441, declaring 
that Iraq was in “material breach” of its obligations and called on Baghdad to co-operate 
immediately. Iraq agreed to allow inspector back into the country and on November 27 
the first UNMOVIC inspectors arrived in Iraq. UNMOVIC conducted inspections in Iraq 
for 111 days, until the 2003 U.S. led invasion. UNMOVIC conducted 731 inspections at 
411 sites—88 of which had not been inspected by UNSCOM. The Iraq Nuclear 
Verification Office carried out 237 nuclear inspections at 148 sites, including 27 new 
ones, with over 1600 buildings. One IAEA inspector recalled:  
The last period of inspections, between November 2002 and March 2003, 
was of a quite different nature, with regard to global attention and what 
seemed to be at stake. Some perceived that war or peace were now firmly 
resting on the shoulders of the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectorates.155  
 
On March 7, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the UNSC 
that, "After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or 
plausible indications of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.”156 Nonetheless, 
the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors left Iraq on March 18, 2003 and on March 20 a 
coalition led by the United States invaded Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was again 
in “material breach” of UNSC resolution 687. 
 After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the CIA’s Iraq Survey 
Group (ISG) took up the job of completing the disarmament of Iraq. In September 2004, 
the ISG reported that they had not found any evidence that Saddam Hussein had 
reconstituted his nuclear program. The post-war failure of U.S. and coalition forces to 
discover undeclared nuclear weapons facilities “gilded the reputation of both UNSCOM 
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and UNMOVIC.”157 Former UNSCOM adviser Tim Trevan argues that economic 
coercion was effective in curbing Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Trevan writes that 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told UN inspectors that "the only reason Iraq was 
cooperating with UNSCOM was that it wanted to be reintegrated into the international 
community. Chief among the benefits was the lifting of the economic sanctions."158 
Egyptian diplomat Nabil Fahmy is skeptical that there is anything to be learned from the 
case of Iraq that can be applied to the broader puzzle of nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle East. Fahmy writes: 
UNSCOM’s experience was one of disarmament by coercion. Iraq 
represented a truly exceptional case in terms of proliferation and therefore 
required exceptional mechanisms. It is merely stating the obvious that the 
Iraqi case cannot be the model for addressing the proliferation problem in 
the Middle East, although some lessons can be drawn, particularly with 
regard to future verification mechanisms.159  
 
One scholar draws a pessimistic conclusion from the shocking discovery of Iraq’s 
extensive clandestine nuclear program: “If the Iraqi case has taught us anything, it is that 
technology and know how are so easily accessible that any country that wants nuclear 
weapons badly enough can probably obtain them if persistent.”160  
 
Saddam’s Nuclear Incentives 
Why did the Saddam Hussein’s regime pursue nuclear weapons so relentlessly? It 
is estimated that after the Israeli strike on the Osiraq reactor, the Iraqi nuclear program 
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increased from a program of 400 scientists and $400 million to 7,000 scientists and $10 
billion dollars.161 Saddam may have been motivated by a fear of Israel’s nuclear 
capability; or he may have believed that acquiring the means to credibly threaten Israel's 
security would provide him with a position of leadership in the Arab world. Arab and 
Iranian leaders often burnish their revisionist credentials by threatening the Jewish state. 
The experience of the war with Iran may have also driven Hussein’s quest for nuclear 
capability. The ISG report stated: “All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be 
Iraq’s principal enemy in the region and generally ranked Tehran first and Tel Aviv as a 
more distant second as their primary adversary.”162 In addition to security motives, 
however, there were significant domestic sources driving Saddam’s demand for nuclear 
weapons. Etel Solingen argues that regime survival – and not state survival – was the 
ultimate motivation for Iraq’s nuclear program.163 Saddam Hussein consolidated his 
power through an extensive patronage system and pursued foreign military adventures as 
a way to increase state revenue more than for geo-strategic reasons. Saddam Hussein also 
fits the leader psychology framework that Jacques Hymans proposes to explain nuclear 
proliferation. Saddam was an “oppositional nationalist” leader who possessed an, 
“intense fear of an external enemy combined with an equally intense pride in [his] 
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Egypt’s Nuclear Strategy 
 
Egypt is the only country in the Middle East that can convincingly be argued to 
have pursued nuclear weapons in reaction to Israel’s nuclear capability. Egypt and Israel 
fought major military confrontations in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. The two states share 
a border, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula for 15 years and Egypt perceived Israel as 
an enemy and security threat. In addition, Egypt is the most populous Arab country and 
views itself as a natural leader of the Arab world. Gamal Abdel Nasser valued the 
prestige nuclear weapons would give Egypt. In 1960, in response to the revelation of 
Israel’s nuclear reactor in Dimona, Nasser delivered a speech at Port Said and declared:  
If we are sure that Israel is making an atom bomb, it will mean the 
beginning of war between us and Israel, because we cannot permit Israel 
to manufacture an atom bomb. It is inevitable that we should attack the 
base of aggression even if we have to mobilize four million to destroy 
it.165  
 
Rather than launch a preventive strike, however, Nasser built up Egypt’s nuclear 
capability. Egypt was denied its request for nuclear devices from both China and the 
Soviet Union. Nasser failed to get a Soviet nuclear guarantee, a fact that created the 
incentive for an indigenous Egyptian deterrent. In the end, Nasser’s nuclear ambitions 
were dashed by Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. Gawdat Bahgat argues that 
Egyptian leaders never assigned a high value to nuclear weapons and were not seriously 
committed to building them in the first place. 166 In addition, Egypt’s close relationship 
with the United States has reinforced the perception of the low utility of an indigenous 
nuclear deterrent.  
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Egypt signed the NPT in 1967 but put off ratifying the treaty in order to exert 
leverage on Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons. In 1981, two years after signing a 
peace treaty with Israel, Egypt finally ratified the NPT. Since then, Cairo has chosen to 
base its security and prestige on championing a MENWFZ and pressuring Israel to join 
the NPT. Egyptian officials argue that the NPT cannot have any credibility with the 
countries in the region as long as Israel maintains its nuclear arsenal. “At the global 
level,” Nabil Fahmy writes, “we will witness the gradual erosion of the credibility of the 
regime itself, and at the regional level the continuation of creeping proliferation trends 
that will further undermine the efficacy of the nonproliferation regime.”167  
There have been various efforts to negotiate mutual arms limitations agreements 
in the Middle East but none has produced any tangible results. On December 9, 1974, a 
Egyptian and Iranian proposal to create a NWFZ in the Middle East resulted in the 
adoption of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 3263, which 
recommended the creation of a MENWFZ for the first time. The resolution’s aim was “to 
keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race.” 
Resolution 3263 states, “the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones with an 
adequate system of safeguards could accelerate the process toward nuclear disarmament 
and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international 
control.”168 Since 1980, the UNGA has adopted annual resolutions calling for the 
establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Israel abstained from voting on the 
resolution until 1980 when it endorsed the resolution for the first time.  
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On April 16, 1990, Egypt submitted a proposal to the UN outlining a 
comprehensive plan for a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) in the 
Middle East. A few months later, Mohamed Nabil Fahmy published an article in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists stating, “Egypt believes that creating an effective zone 
would reduce tension and generate impetus to resolving political conflict in the region, 
because it would exemplify the readiness of all countries to take into account the security 
concerns of others.”169 Israeli scholar Gerald Steiner believes the so-called Mubarak Plan, 
“largely reflected the efforts of political leaders to gain political and diplomatic 
advantage through the appearance, if not the substance, of arms control.”170 Nonetheless, 
the goal of creating a WMDFZ in the Middle East has been broadly endorsed by both the 
international community and states in the region. The annual resolution adopted by the 
UNGA endorsing a MENWFZ includes the proposals of the Mubarak Plan for a ban on 
all WMD. In 1991, UNSC resolution 687 stated that the actions taken to disarm Iraq 
“represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from 
weapons of mass destruction.”171 
To facilitate the goal expressed in UNCR 687, the Secretary-General released a 
report one year later titled, “Effective and Verifiable Measures Which Would Facilitate 
the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Middle East.” The report 
proposed the inclusion of, “the area extending from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the 
West, to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the East, and from Syria in the North to the 
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People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South.”172 The report excludes Turkey 
from this zone because, “Turkey is a NATO member and it has been generally assumed 
that it has United States nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.”  
There have been several different proposals for how to delimit the boundaries of a 
MENWFZ. Nabil Fahmy has proposed that the zone should not be determined by 
geographic coordinates such as the Latin American NWFZ, but rather by the countries 
that will be included within its limits. Fahmy proposes the following countries:   
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the 
Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.173  
 
Another perspective argue that a MENWFZ should begin with states in the core of the 
Middle East that might be involved in military confrontation in which nuclear weapons or 
threats could be used and later expand to other states in the region.  
The only arms control conference to ever take place in the Middle East was the 
Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) multilateral working group that grew out of 
the Madrid Conference and Arab-Israeli peace process. Thirteen Arab states, Israel and a 
Palestinian delegation participated in the ACRS talks, along with several states outside 
the region, including the United States, Russia and Canada. Syria, Iran, Iraq and Libya, 
however, were not involved in the ACRS working group. The absence of these states 
affected the legitimacy and efficacy of the process and reflected their rejectionist stance 
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toward normalized relations with Israel, a factor that will be difficult to resolve in any 
future regional arms control initiatives. 
The ACRS agenda focused almost exclusively on confidence-building measures 
(CBMs), including CBMs about sharing information regarding military exercises and 
never addressed arms control issues relating to nuclear or conventional weapons. This 
stemmed from a fundamentally different approach to arms control and regional peace. 
The Egyptian representatives believed that progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process 
should be linked to the end of Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Israeli officials, on the other 
hand, wanted progress toward regional peace to precede any discussion on arms control. 
The ACRS talks collapsed in part because of this disagreement about the sequencing of 
discussions on arms control and a MENWFZ. Egyptian diplomat Mohammed Shaker 
believes the ACRS working group, “would have been an ideal vehicle to promote and 
develop the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.”174 
There has not been a meeting of the ACRS working group since September 1995.  
Israeli scholar Emily Landau argues that CBMs were opposed by Arab states 
simply because they came to be indentified with the Israeli position, rather than being 
understood as “serious arms control measures grounded in conceptual logic that posits 
improving the regional atmosphere is essential in order to approach WMD 
disarmament.”175 Egyptian diplomat Nabil Fahmy argues: 
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the perception that the ACRS process foundered solely because of 
disagreement on the nuclear issue is not entirely accurate. Rather, it was 
Israel’s reluctance to address any form of arms control during these 
negotiations prior to achieving peace with all its neighbors that posed the 
problem.176  
 
On May 11, 1995, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC), all 
the signatories to the treaty agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely. In the months leading 
up to the conference – before the ACRS talks ended – Egypt, joined by other Arab states 
and Iran, began to pressure Israel to change its policy on the NPT. In August 1994, 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Mousa made his first official trip to Israel for the purpose 
of presenting his case for NPT accession. After the trip, Egyptian official announced that 
they were going to seek the support of the Arab League and non-aligned movement 
(NAM) to link the extension of the NPT with Israel changing its nuclear policy. On 
March 23, 1995, Egypt hosted a special meeting of Arab League ministers in order to 
create a single Arab position for the NPTREC. Egyptian leaders also indicated that Egypt 
would withdraw from the NPT unless the issue of universality and Israeli                     
non-membership was addressed specifically at the NPTREC. During this period, Shimon 
Peres presented a more specific version of the Israeli policy, pledging to “begin 
negotiation of a MENWFZ two years after bilateral peace agreements are signed with all 
states, including Iran.”177  
Egypt tried to convince other Arab states to withhold support for the indefinite 
extension of the NPT unless the conference adopted a resolution that applied direct 
pressure on Israel. In his statement to the conference, the Syrian foreign minister 
declared, “Syria cannot agree to the extension of the NPT unless Israel accedes to the 
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Treaty and subjects its nuclear installation to international inspection.”178 Amr Mousa 
declared that: 
the treaty as it stands today and in view of the absence of accession to it by 
a neighbor with well known nuclear capabilities, is incapable of 
safeguarding the national security of Egypt. Consequently, Egypt finds 
itself today in a position where she cannot support the indefinite extension 
of the Treaty.179  
 
In the end, the NPTREC adopted a resolution on the Middle East that endorsed 
the establishment of a MENFZ and urged all countries in the region with unsafeguarded 
nuclear facilities –i.e. Israel – “to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place 
their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards.”180 Egyptian scholars and officials argue that the Egyptian position is based 
on national security threat perception, and not a desire for prestige and leadership in the 
Arab world. They argue that Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons are “a serious threat to 
Egyptian national security because it means that Egypt must be totally dependent on 
Israel’s good intentions rather than a system of balance of power that guarantees military 
stability. No country in the world can be dependent on the good will of a former 
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the multiplicity of conflicts, and the stated Egyptian objective of reducing 
Israel to its ‘natural size,’ indicate that Cairo’s campaign on the NPT was 
not fundamentally motivated by threat perceptions but rather is means of 
slowing the process of normalization between Israel and other Arab states 
in the effort to enhance Egypt’s own power in the region. For Egypt the 
NPTREC, the ACRS process and bilateral discussions with Israel were not 
seen as the basis for stability that would serve the interests of all states in 
the region but rather an arena of conflict in a broader zero-sum game.182  
 
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Egypt again led members of the NAM in 
threatening to withhold support for the conferences final document unless a resolution on 
the MENWFZ was included. A consensus decision was reached to convene a conference 
in 2012 on the establishment of a MENWFZ. Israel, however, ended up refusing to attend 
the conference scheduled to take place in Helsinki, Finland. A researcher at the James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies observed: “Egypt will have to make a 
strategic decision. What is more important to them: To start a regional security dialogue 
or isolate Israel?”183 Emily Landau argues that the failure to agree to the terms of the 
2012 conference results from, “The stark incongruence between the goal of creating a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East and the somber 
realities on the ground in this region.”184 
Egyptian and Israeli officials also disagree on what procedures should be used to 
verify compliance with non-proliferation in a MENWFZ. Although NWFZ are regional 
treaties, Egypt has supported the IAEA and framework of the NPT as a safeguard system 
in the Middle East. In light of the record of violations in the region, Israeli officials reject 
a regional NWFZ that depends on a global mechanism for verification of compliance. In 
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addition, Israeli officials tend to view international organizations as inherently biased 
against the Jewish state are not likely to depend on them for security. Israeli 
policymakers endorse a system modeled on the Brazil-Argentine bilateral inspections 
framework and argue, “that states that reject mutual inspection are essentially rejecting 
regional coexistence.”185  
The Israeli thinking on a future MENWFZ can be summed up: “Disarmament is 
not fundamentally a technical discussion but rather a political transformation.”186 Iranian 
and Arab leaders, led by Egypt, believe disarmament will create the conditions for peace 
and therefore disagree on the sequence of steps to be taken toward a MENWFZ. Nabil 
Fahmy argues that the United States and Soviet Union conducted arms control 
agreements during the Cold War and that the five existing NWFZs were negotiated while 
there was still conflict in the respective regions. Fahmy concludes, “All of these cases 
disprove the argument that arms control must be placed on hold pending the resolution of 
geopolitical conflicts. To the contrary, the record suggests that the arms control process 
can assist in mitigating such conflicts.”187 
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Obstacles to a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
 
 
More countries in the Middle East have pursued nuclear weapons than in any 
other region of the world. Nuclear weapons are generally considered political tools with 
no offensive military value; leaders in the Middle East, however, have contemplated 
using nuclear weapons in war. Iraq’s crash program leading up to the 1991 Gulf War was 
motivated by Saddam Hussein’s desire to use nuclear weapons against Israeli cities or 
American troops. Israeli military officials also considered using nuclear weapons during 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. When Defense Minister Moshe Dayan feared Israel would be 
overrun by the Syrian and Egyptian militaries he began talking about “The end of the 
third kingdom” and proposed using Israel’s weapon of last resort to forestall national 
destruction.188 Instead, Prime Minister Gold Meir convinced the United States to resupply 
Israel with arms and avoided a potentially catastrophic decision. These instances 
demonstrate that in a high-conflict region like the Middle East nuclear weapons could 
end up being used in war. Nuclear disarmament and abolition are the only way to 
guarantee the security of the region from the devastation of nuclear weapons. 
Israel’s ambiguous nuclear deterrent is frequently cited as the cause of nuclear 
ambitions in the Middle East and every leader in the region that has pursued nuclear 
weapons has claimed the need to deter Israel. This view is often taken for granted by 
academics and policymakers. One scholar argues: 
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It is no secret that Israel’s nuclear capability, since its presumed inception 
in the early 1970s, has been the foremost incentive for the Arab world and 
Iran to embark upon developing their own “equalizers,” which have taken 
the form of chemical or biological weapons programs and missile delivery 
systems as well as the clandestine attempts to develop nuclear weapons.189  
 
Israel’s ambiguous nuclear capabilities even provided Muammar Qaddafi with a pretext 
for pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Iranian officials often cite Israel’s nuclear 
posture as the main incentive for Tehran’s nuclear program. In 1991, the deputy president 
of Iran argued that because Israel has nuclear weapons, “the Muslims states, too, should 
be equipped with the same capacity.”190 Anti-Israel rhetoric is valuable currency for 
leaders in the Middle East and conceals the true motives of their nuclear ambitions. The 
need to deter Israel is the only way to justify a nuclear policy that has a ruinous effect on 
the economy and exposes the country to military attack. In addition, hostile rhetoric 
directed at the Jewish state and a policy that promises to threaten its existence has the 
added benefit of bolstering a leader’s rejectionist, anti-Zionist credentials. Iraqi and 
Iranian leaders justified their nuclear programs by arguing the need to deter Israel despite 
the fact that both countries considered each other a greater security threat than Israel.  
The focus on Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons as the source of regional 
proliferation and instability has defined every regional proposal for the establishment of a 
MENWFZ. The evidence shows, however, that leaders have been motivated by domestic 
political incentives, as well as Arab-Arab and Arab-Iranian conflict. Kenneth Waltz’s 
argument for an Iranian bomb is also based on the false assumption that Israel is the 
center of all conflict in the region. Neither a balance of military power in the Middle East 
nor nuclear abolition can mitigated the domestic sources of nuclear ambition. The pride 
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and prestige associated with nuclear capability, as well as leader psychology and regime 
survival strategy explain nuclear pursuit in Iraq and Iran more than the need to deter 
Israel. 
A regional non-proliferation regime cannot alter a leader’s perceived utility of 
nuclear weapons if the source of his ambition is nationalist pride or an inward-looking 
strategy of regime survival that benefits from international isolation. Arms control 
treaties are designed to mitigate the security dilemma by creating transparency and 
lowering the cost of cooperation. But these measures only make sense if security threats 
are the incentive for an arms race in the first place. Emily Landau points out the 
inconsistency of addressing domestic sources of proliferation with arms control treaties:  
 
The prevailing assumption in regional arms control efforts is that states are 
equally threatened and defensively oriented with regard to WMD, and that 
their fears in this regard can be overcome if they are able to better 
communicate, clarify intentions, and reduce uncertainties. However, this 
assumption is challenged by the fact that Iran is driven primarily by its 
regional hegemonic ambitions, not concerns for its security per se.191  
 
The lesson learned from Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is that a 
willing state can break its NPT obligation and not only deceive verification and 
compliance measures but also manipulate them to conceal a military program. The 
inability of nuclear verification and compliance procedures to guarantee non-proliferation 
was foreseen at the beginning of the nuclear age. In 1946, Bernard Baruch presented a 
U.S. proposal for the abolition of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly. The 
Baruch Plan was based on the Acheson-Lilienthal report, which stated: “There is no 
prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to 
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outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar 
police-like methods.” The diffusion of nuclear technology and its proliferation by illicit 
black market networks makes a regime of inspections even more problematic than when 
the report was released nearly 70 years ago.  
Saddam Hussein was able to hide unsafeguarded facilities in plain site and his 
deception proves the need for a robust regional compliance and verification system in the 
Middle East. Nonetheless, Egyptian proposals for a MENWFZ have repeatedly suggested 
that the IAEA Safeguards Agreement is capable of verifying a state’s compliance with its 
non-proliferation obligations. Relying on an international framework is not only 
insufficient to convince Israel to disarm but would not ultimately inspire confidence in 
other Middle East states and could provoke a country to pursue a weapons program or a 
strategy of hedging, as Iran has done. 
 Iran has not engaged in any nuclear activities that are proscribed the NPT. Instead 
Iran has remained committed to the norm of non-proliferation while developing its 
technical and scientific base. The international community has utilized diplomatic and 
economic tools to increase the amount of time it would take Iran to “break out” of its 
treaty obligations and pursue a crash program to build a bomb. Any country that operates 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities is capable of developing latent nuclear weapons capability as 
a strategy of nuclear hedging. If and when the country makes the political decision to 
build a bomb there may not be sufficient notice to stop it. A MENWFZ will have to be 
based on a system of safeguards capable of creating a sufficient and credible obstacle to 
the development of  “break out” nuclear capacity.  
 
Another important lesson to learn from Iran’s nuclear program is that inspectors 
can only verify the correctness and completeness of declared facilities. In 2003, Iran’s 
Natanz uranium enrichment facility was discovered and in 2009, Tehran revealed the 
existence of another clandestine uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. The existence of 
these facilities was not known by the IAEA or national intelligence agencies. There is the 
real possibility that Iran is still maintaining a covert enrichment facility. 
In the end, only political incentives, and not the control of technology, can create 
the necessary conditions for a MENWFZ. The Middle East is the least democratic region 
in the world and although there is no evidence that autocratic regimes are more likely to 
pursue nuclear weapons, they are more likely to fight wars with other autocracies. The 
insight of the liberal democratic peace theory, which shows that democracies do not fight 
wars with each other, can shed light on states’ nuclear weapons ambitions. Etel Solingen 
observes: “Of all the nuclear aspirants in the second nuclear age, no democracy appears 
to have considered or acquired nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring other 
democracies.”192 The Israeli approach to establishing a MENWFZ does not emphasize 
democratic governance per se, but it does focus on establishing peaceful and normalized 
relations in the region. Egyptian initiatives have consistently overlooked both domestic 
political and diplomatic themes and instead focus exclusively on disarming Israel. Israeli 
disarmament and the abolition of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would make the 
region safer but it would not eliminate the incentives of nuclear pursuit in the Middle 
East. Only transparent democratic governance and peaceful interstate relations can 
eliminate the perceived utility of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.  
                                                




Iran and 18 members of the Arab League, including Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen do not recognize the State of Israel. Egypt was kicked out of the Arab League 
in 1979 for signing a peace treaty with the Jewish state. This hostility toward Israel and to 
states that accept its existence has played out in Middle East arms control negotiations, 
which often become an exercise in gamesmanship and thinly veiled hostility. MENWFZ 
negotiations often exacerbate the conflict that states are trying to resolve. Israel is the 
only state that will have to take concrete steps toward disarmament in order to establish a 
MENWFZ. Shimon Peres has expressed Israel’s willingness to disarm. “Give me peace, 
and we will give up the atom.” Peres said. “That’s the whole story. If we achieve regional 
peace, I think we can make the whole Middle East free of any nuclear threat.”193 
Nonetheless, Arab and Iranian proposals continue to insist that the first step to regional 
peace must be Israeli nuclear transparency and disarmament. In an influential essay on 
nuclear proliferation, Richard Betts argued, "To demand that a government forgo nuclear 
weapons is to demand that it compromises its own sovereignty. To expect it to do so 
without any compensating quid pro quo would not only be condescending but 
naive."194 Israeli officials want normalized diplomatic relations with all states in the 
region before initiating negotiation on a NWFZ. For states to expect Israel to disarm 
without meeting these basic requirements is not only condescending but naïve. 
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